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ABSTRACT 
LOCAL GOVERNMENT FINANCING AND PROVISION IN AN 
INSTITUTIONALLY CONSTRAINED DECENTRALIZED SYSTEM: THE CASE OF 
AGRICULTURAL EXTENSION IN UGANDA 
 
By 
 
ABDU  MUWONGE 
 
May, 2007 
 
Committee Chair: Dr. Sally Wallace 
Major Department: Economics 
 
 
Decentralization is a key governance reform which many developing countries 
have embarked on. Local governments are expected to use their informational advantage 
to improve the delivery of public goods. This result implied by Tiebout’s (1956) model 
requires fully informed citizens who “vote with their feet.” The model’s application to 
developing countries has been limited, since local decisions may not be responsive to 
local demands.  
Practitioners are shifting to innovations that minimize institutional constraints so 
that decentralized programs can lead to improved outcomes. Examples of such innovative 
ways include decentralized agricultural extension programs, which embrace farmers’ 
empowerment, local government, and private sector participation.  
Few impact evaluation studies on agricultural extension have combined 
qualitative and quantitative methods. This dissertation contributes to the literature by 
applying these methods and survey data to study the impact of a decentralized extension 
program in Uganda, known as the National Agricultural Advisory Services (NAADS) on 
  xiv
the value of farm production per acre. The program is non-randomly assigned to local 
governments and farmers self-select in or out within participating sub-counties.  
Using a sample of 305 participating and non-participating farmers and local 
government assessment indicators as instruments, we cannot reject the null that the 
NAADS program has had an impact. The 2SLS results show no program impact; 
however, the OLS results show that the program had a positive impact on the value of 
farm production per acre of about 20 percent. Qualitative results show that NAADS 
farmers: participate in local decision making processes through farmers’ institutions; 
have increased knowledge on farming; and practice enterprise diversification. The 
quantitative finding must be treated with caution; for example, the study did not account 
for spillover effects.  
The NAADS program faces challenges inherent in Uganda’s decentralized 
structure; particularly the low financial and human capacity, and the weak monitoring at 
the local level.  
The policy implications include: the need to strengthen farmers’ institutions; 
development of a marketing strategy; clear policy guidelines for local government 
support to NAADS; improved coordination of NAADS activities among line ministries; 
need for additional resources for NAADS activities; and improved capacity of service 
providers.
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CHAPTER ONE. BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY 
Introduction 
Decentralization is among the key governance reforms which many developing 
countries have embarked on (Bardhan, 2002). Decentralization has many different 
aspects including allowing local government representatives to be selected through local 
elections (political decentralization), transferring authority and responsibility for service 
delivery to local governments (administrative decentralization) and shifting authority to 
raise adequate revenues and to make expenditure decisions to the local level (fiscal 
decentralization) (Litvack, Ahmad, & Bird, 1998).1 Decentralization is viewed by its 
proponents as a way to make government more responsive and efficient (Oates, 1999). 
Lower levels of government are increasingly involved in the implementation of 
decentralized programs with the hope that, by being closer to the beneficiaries, the local 
governments can use their informational advantage to improve the provision of public 
goods. 
The Tiebout (1956) model sets the stage for studying the economics of local 
public goods provision. The model assumes mobility of the population, implying that 
fully informed citizens “vote with their feet” in response to differential public 
performance. Despite its implications for local public good provision in the context of 
developed countries, the model’s applicability to developing countries has been criticized 
(Bahl & Linn, 1992). 
                                                 
1 There are three main forms of decentralization, namely: deconcentration, delegation and devolution. 
Deconcentration occurs when lower levels of government (e.g., regional or municipal) execute functions 
on behalf of the central government without having decision making authority. Delegation is the process in 
which the central government transfers decision making over certain functions to relatively autonomous 
local governments, which have limited autonomy and are ultimately responsible to the central government. 
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Thus, adapting the theory of fiscal federalism in developing countries has meant 
that practitioners have had to rethink the notion that under decentralization allocated 
funds reach their intended beneficiaries (Bardhan, 2002) and that the demand for local 
public goods is actually met. Decentralized programs are confronted with institutional 
constraints such as corruption, weak public management systems, information 
asymmetries, inadequate manpower, high administrative costs, local capture by the 
elite/politicians, and soft budget constraints.2 These constraints work to impede the 
realization of central government objectives such as poverty reduction through targeted 
decentralized programs for a variety of services ranging from social service provision 
(e.g., education, health) to physical infrastructure and agricultural extension. 
More recently, the theory of fiscal federalism has been extended to incorporate 
institutional constraints in the context of political agency models (Qian & Weingast, 
1997; Lin & Nugent, 1995).These models explain, for example, how the electorate (as 
principals) may be less informed than the elected representatives (agents) or the center 
(as a principal) may be less informed than the sub-national governments (agents) about 
the local needs, delivery costs and the amount of the public good actually delivered 
(Bardhan, 2002; Betancourt & Gleason, 2000). The informed sub-national government 
officials may malevolently use their informational advantage to capture the program (e.g., 
as shown by Reinikka & Svensson, 2004) or may collude with other special interest 
groups such as s (PSPs) sub-contracted to provide services to the poor (e.g., delegation of 
local public works problem analyzed by Besfamille, 2004a, (2004b). In these cases 
                                                                                                                                                 
Devolution involves the complete transfer of decision making over finance and management of public 
services to quasi-autonomous local government units.  
2 The World Development Report (2004) discusses the consequences of such constraints on service 
delivery as well as the mechanisms to mitigate them (World Bank, 2004). 
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imperfect information and the lack of accountability undermine the potential benefits of a 
decentralized approach to service provision. In Besfamille’s (2004a; 2004b) analysis, 
local public works construction is delegated to local authorities, which in turn sub-
contract the construction of local roads to private firms. The local authorities may 
exaggerate the jurisdictional preferences for the project during administrative procedures 
that allocate the federal grant. In that framework, incentive problems arise because the 
local authority may have some interests in the project’s effective undertaking and so may 
inflate its cost, the efficiency of the contractor or even the expected benefit of the project 
to society. 
To mitigate the consequences of such institutional constraints, innovative 
programs of improving decentralized service delivery in rural areas in developing areas 
are emerging. These include decentralized agricultural extension programs, whose aims 
include increasing agricultural productivity and household incomes of farmers and thus 
assist in reducing poverty by empowering beneficiaries to demand the “right” advisory 
services and to hold accountable the service providers (Chapman & Tripp, 2003; World 
Bank., 2005a). As noted by Birkhaeuser & Evenson (1991) and Evenson (2001) effective 
agricultural extension can bridge the gap between discoveries in the science laboratory 
and changes in the individual farmer’s fields. In addition to information about cropping 
techniques, optimal input use, high yield varieties, and prices, extensionists can inform 
farmers about improved record keeping and assist in the development of their 
management skills, thus facilitating a shift to more efficient methods of production. 
Unlike the 1970s and 1980s, agricultural extension systems worldwide are 
increasingly decentralized with the private sector increasingly involved in the provision 
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of extension services (World Bank, 2005a). However, the public sector maintains the 
funding function at least during the early stages of implementation of extension 
programs.3 The programs incorporate bottom-up approaches grounded on the principals 
of farmer empowerment to own local decision making processes including nurturing their 
ability to demand extension services and to hold accountable the administrators and 
providers of extension (Rivera & Zijp, 2002). This shift is in sharp contrast to the 
traditional agricultural extension programs including the Training and Visit (T and V) 
system that involved public funding and provision and lacked bottom-up participatory 
approaches (Antholt, 1998). 
By targeted programs we mean programs that are designed to address the 
concerns (e.g., welfare) of specific groups of people, notably the poor or the marginalized 
(Ravallion, 2006). Targeted programs implicitly recognize the fact that decentralization 
alone may not lead to improved service delivery if, for example, program beneficiaries 
are not empowered to counter the institutional constraints. By empowerment, the local 
beneficiaries of decentralized programs actively participate in the decision making 
processes that lead to the provision and/or the financing of the services such as 
agricultural extension. This arrangement makes the local authorities accountable to the 
local people and thus, may minimize program capture and collusive behavior that may 
lead to inefficient outcomes in service delivery. In addition, by tailoring services to local 
needs, outcomes from government programs may improve-thus contributing to poverty 
reduction. Examples of such decentralized and privatized agricultural extension programs 
are currently running in Latin America (e.g., in Chile, Venezuela, Honduras) and in Asia 
                                                 
3 As a pure public good, there is always a justification for the public sector to intervene, since the private 
sector may not efficiently provide the extension public good. 
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(India and Pakistan) (World Bank, 2005a). However, little is known about the impact of 
such decentralized agricultural extension programs. This thesis contributes to the 
literature by addressing this gap. 
We evaluate the impact of a targeted decentralized agricultural advisory services 
program in Uganda known as the NAADS, which was created as an independent 
institution by Act of Parliament in November, 2001 and charged with the objective of 
revamping Uganda’s agricultural productivity through the provision of decentralized, 
demand-driven and privately-provided advisory services to the farmers (Republic of 
Uganda, 2000a). At its inception, six districts namely, Arua, Kabale, Kibaale, Mukono, 
Soroti and Tororo were selected to pilot the NAADS.4 By 2005, the NAADS program 
had covered 37 districts in 344 sub-counties out of about 857 sub-counties in 76 districts 
in Uganda (Republic of Uganda, 2005c). 5 The program rolls out to new districts and sub-
counties on a fiscal year basis in line with Uganda’s budget cycle and accounting 
framework, the Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF). It is expected that 
NAADS will cover the entire country by 2008 (Republic of Uganda, 2005c). Among the 
key design features of NAADS are emphasizing participatory processes by empowering 
farmer groups to demand advisory services, targeting the “poor”, shifting the focal point 
of service delivery to local governments in line with the broader reform of 
decentralization, and the contractual arrangements for advisory services between farmers’ 
groups and the PSPs (Republic of Uganda, 2000a). 
                                                 
4 These districts were chosen based on specific criteria that included the local government assessment 
indicators measuring how well a district manages previous or other ongoing government programs. The 
criteria included the availability and quality of development plan, the degree of communication and 
accountability mechanisms, local revenue performance, and availability of monitoring and evaluation 
mechanisms. Other factors considered include the agricultural potential of the district. 
5 Number includes only rural sub-counties. 
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There are important reasons why we choose to study agricultural extension in 
Uganda and moreover, within a decentralization framework. Uganda is predominantly an 
agro-based economy with agriculture contributing about 40 percent of Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP), of which over 60 percent is composed of food crops. The sector is a 
source of livelihood to more than 80 percent of the population in Uganda (World Bank., 
2005b). The bulk of agriculture is smallholder agriculture with the majority poor farmers 
who grow mainly for subsistence. In addition, the 1999 Uganda National Household 
Survey (UNHS) evidence indicated that agriculture accounted for more than two-thirds of 
households’ earned income. Since poverty in Uganda is mainly a rural phenomenon, with 
the rural areas predominantly agro-based, policy interventions that mitigate the 
constraints to agricultural productivity are crucial to poverty reduction.6 Moreover, 
Uganda’s high potential to provide food security to its population and to the East African 
region is expected to boost its quest for sustained economic growth and structural 
transformation (Republic of Uganda, 2001a, 2001b). 
The transformation of the agricultural sector is faced with problems such as the 
lack of skilled labor, limited research and extension services, poor technology, lack of 
purchased inputs, and low capital (Republic of Uganda, 2000a, 2000d). With reference to 
agricultural extension services, Reinikka & Collier ( 2001) noted that extension services 
remained limited and only one-third of the communities studied in the 1999 UNHS had 
reported having been served by an extension worker. Although additional survey 
                                                 
6 Based on UNHS data, the proportion of people below the poverty line in urban areas has declined from 
27.8 percent in 1992 to 9.6 percent in 1999/2000. However, this proportion increased to 12. 2 percent in 
2002/2003. On the other hand, the proportion of the people below the poverty line in rural areas was 59.7 
percent in 1992, declined to 37.4 percent in 1999/2000, before increasing to 41.1 percent in 2002/2003. The 
proportion of crop farmers below the poverty line was 50 percent in 2002/2003 (Republic of Uganda, 
2005).  
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evidence revealed that the coverage of extension services increased from 11 percent of 
farmers in 1992 to 17 percent in 1999, it was noted that only 5 percent of producers at the 
national level had reported contact with an extension worker more than twice a year 
(Deininger & Okidi, 2001). The authors further found that at the village level, about 64 
percent of the respondents reported that the community was not at all reached by 
extension services. In addition, in all regions of Uganda households relied more on radio 
than on extension workers for information on technology. Owing in part to dismal 
performance of extension services during the 1990s, agricultural productivity has been 
limited. Deininger & Okidi (2001) suggested that in addition to the investment in human 
capital and infrastructure including improved access to markets, there was a great need 
for improved availability and awareness about agricultural technologies through research 
and extension. 
Despite the challenges facing the agricultural sector, the Ugandan economy 
registered real GDP growth rates averaging 5.98 percent over the period 1996-2004. The 
agriculture sector accounted for 38.7 percent of GDP in 2002/03, as compared to 51.1 
percent in 1991/92 and poverty was reduced from 56 percent in 1992 to 34 percent in 
1999/2000 (Republic of Uganda, 2001b). However, recent analysis based on the 2003 
UNHS suggests that poverty increased from 34 percent to 38 percent between 1999/2000 
and 2002/03 (Republic of Uganda, 2003). The increase in poverty is particularly marked 
for households in crop agriculture (Republic of Uganda, 2005b). It is argued that among 
the factors explaining the rise in poverty is less investment to the productive sectors, 
particularly agriculture (Nabbumba & Kuteesa, 2004). Agriculture had the slowest 
growth rate amongst the major sectors, averaging 3.8 percent per annum between 
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1990/91 and 2002/03, although growth was slightly higher in the last five years, at 4.4 
percent per annum. 
Against this background, the Uganda Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP) 
(Republic of Uganda, 2000e, 2001b, 2005c) lays out the different sectoral interventions 
aimed at poverty eradication (Republic of Uganda, 2005c). With respect to the 
agricultural sector, the Plan for the Modernization of Agriculture (PMA) lays out seven 
key components to address problems such as inadequate markets and credit access as 
well as inadequate agricultural extension services and poor agricultural practices among 
Uganda’s farmers. The aim of the PMA is the transformation of subsistence agriculture 
into commercial agriculture through agricultural advisory services, agricultural research 
and extension, agricultural marketing and processing, rural finance, agricultural 
education, natural resource management, and physical supportive infrastructure (Republic 
of Uganda, 2000a). This study focuses on agricultural advisory services with reference to 
the NAADS program since of all the seven components, the NAADS is arguably the 
most important innovation under the PMA (Omamo, 2005) and one that has actually 
taken off much more in terms of implementation (Republic of Uganda, 2005c). 
Another reason for studying NAADS is that estimating the impact of the NAADS 
program is relevant for analyzing the modernization of Uganda’s decentralized 
agricultural extension. Prior to the decentralization program which commenced in 1993, 
the central government was in charge of service delivery arrangements including 
agricultural extension. With decentralized governance over the 1990s, agricultural 
extension was decentralized to the local government level; however, just like the 
centralized extension programs, farmers could not access the extension services due to 
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absenteeism from extensionists, selectivity to reach out to rich farmers, and the fact that 
the program was generally not cost-effective for farmers (Republic of Uganda, 2000a, 
2000c, 2001a). 
The innovative decentralized approach to agricultural extension via NAADS is 
expected to result in better agricultural outcomes for farmers versus the traditional 
centralized approaches because it is based on a bottom-top approach that incorporates 
farmers’ empowerment. Therefore, the NAADS program was introduced to redress past 
misfortunes of agricultural extension and to deliver on the expectations of transforming 
agriculture from being subsistence to being commercial in line with the PMA. 
The NAADS program has a mission to increase farmer access to information, 
knowledge and technology for profitable agricultural production over 25 years (Republic 
of Uganda, 2000a). The first phase begun in the fiscal year 2001/2002 and will end in 
2007/2008. The cost of the first phase is estimated at about 108 million U.S. dollars.7 The 
main sources of the funds are donors (these include the International Development 
Association (IDA), the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), 
Department for International Development (DFID), European Union (EU), the 
Netherland International Assistance and the Irish Aid), the Government of Uganda, 
participating local governments (districts and sub-counties) and participating farmers. 
The program is funded from a common basket to which participating stakeholders 
channel their contributions. The donors provide about 80 percent of the NAADS budget 
followed by the Government of Uganda with a contribution of 8 percent. The local 
                                                 
7 As a percentage of the 2002/2003 total public expenditure in the amount of 2352 U.S. million dollars, the 
entire first phase cost of NAADS would constitute approximately 5 percent. 
  
10
 
governments and farmers associations contribute 10 percent and 2 percent respectively 
(Republic of Uganda, 2000c, 2001a). 
Over the 25 year horizon, the farmers and local government shares in the NAADS 
budget are expected to increase. However, this rests on the assumption that the current 
efforts under NAADS will result in a sustained boost in agricultural productivity to raise 
farmers’ income and thus, command purchases of advisory services with little or no 
financial dependence from the other stakeholders. 
As noted above, several unique design features about NAADS make it relevant to 
study its impact as a decentralized program. First, the selection of participating districts 
and sub-counties is in part based on local government assessment indicators for 
decentralized governance. Districts and sub-counties performing “relatively” well in 
terms of accountability, local revenue generation and allocation, monitoring and 
evaluation and quality of local development plan are more likely to be chosen into the 
NAADS program. Second, successfully chosen districts and sub-counties receive central 
conditional transfers earmarked for agricultural and advisory services. The chosen 
districts and sub-counties prepare annual budgets for NAADS activities and submit them 
to the NAADS secretariat, which then triggers the release of the transfers from the 
Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development (MFPED) (Republic of 
Uganda, 2000c, 2001a). 
Third and very critical to the success of the NAADS program is that the sub-
counties, the lowest administrative units in Uganda’s decentralization, are the main units 
of program implementation (Republic of Uganda, 2000a, 2000b, 2000c, 2000d, 2001a). 
The Local Government Resistance Council Statute (1993), the Constitution of the 
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Republic of Uganda (1995), the Local Governments Act (1997), the Local Government 
Financial and Accounting Regulations (1998), and the Local Government Finance 
Commission Act (2003) mandate the local governments as the main units of 
decentralized service delivery. 
As recognized by the FAO and World Bank.(2000), local governments may be an 
appropriate unit for service delivery implementation if they have adequate capacity and 
are accountable to the local population. In line with increased administrative and fiscal 
decentralization, sub-counties receive over 75 percent of the financial allocation of the 
total NAADS budget. The sub-county funds are earmarked to NAADS activities 
including contracting of PSPs, technology development, and capacity building in 
participatory planning, monitoring and evaluation. 
Fourth, the formation of farmers’ groups, the establishment of democratic voting 
processes to elect farmers’ representatives at the sub-county farmers’ forum (SFF), and 
the participatory approaches to selection of viable and profitable enterprises to invest in, 
increases the empowerment of farmers. In 2005, a total of 13,202 farmer groups were 
registered in the NAADS program and engaged in enterprise development and promotion 
(Republic of Uganda, 2004a). The enterprises selected are usually farmer-group specific 
and thus one would expect variation in enterprises selected within a participating sub-
county. Enterprise choice ranges from improved crop varieties to high breed animal 
rearing to aquaculture to bee keeping, among others. 
The farmers’ representatives and farmers’ groups are expected to ensure that the 
PSPs are accountable and deliver according to the contractual obligations. The premise is 
that if farmers adopt the better methods of farming, better agricultural outcomes such as 
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high crop yields, quality animal products, technology access and adoption, use of 
fertilizers, manure and pesticides, better marketing and farmer organizational skills-will 
result. 
From both a theoretical and practical perspective, several issues emerge with 
respect to the implementation and impact of the decentralized NAADS program. These 
include: first, do the subnational government authorities have an incentive to misreport 
the progress on implementation of NAADS activities within their sub-counties or 
misreport annual budgets or even misreport the efficiency of the PSPs in case they 
collude in the anticipation of some gains-rent seeking? Second, do the sub-counties’ 
authorities monitor the NAADS activities to ensure the PSPs deliver according to the 
contractual obligations? Third, are the farmers informed enough to identify the farming 
enterprises that will eventually improve their agricultural outcomes? Fourth, are the 
farmers’ representatives benevolent, and, if so, how do they possibly check on the 
“potential collusion” between the sub-counties and the PSPs? Further, do the sub-county 
authorities and PSPs have the required capacity to manage and implement the NAADS 
program? What measures are in place to protect the contractual obligations of the 
NAADS services? Given that sub-counties coordinate the processes of NAADS including 
the mobilization of farmers groups at inception, do farmers’ perceptions about the sub-
county management affect their decision of whether to participate in NAADS or not? If 
the records at the participating sub-counties indicate that PSPs have delivered the 
advisory services, are the farmers satisfied with the quality of the services provided? And 
overall, what is the impact of access to advisory services among participating farmers? 
Unfortunately, our study does not explicitly address all these questions, except the impact 
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question. Yet the absence of program impact may partly be explained by the institutional 
constraints mentioned above. 
Answering the impact question is an important but intricate issue. Quantifying the 
impact requires that one accounts for the non-random program placement and self-
selection in and out of the program and at the same time recognize the possibility of 
spillover effects to non-participants (Ravallion, 2006) and the intra-group correlations 
common in cross sectional data collected in clustered localities (Deaton, 1997; 
Wooldridge, 2002). In addition, detailed data not only on agricultural outcomes and their 
determinants is required but also one must understand the broader program institutional 
framework (Ravallion, 2003). Although, some of the theoretical questions above such as 
informational asymmetries are non-trivial to test empirically, the use of qualitative 
techniques can give clues about the processes, although they cannot provide causation 
(Rao & Woolcook, 2003). An attempt to answer such questions is made in Chapter 4. 
It is important to place this research in the context of previous work on 
decentralized service delivery in Uganda. Previous empirical work has mainly focused on 
the impact of decentralization on education and health service delivery (see for example, 
Hutchinson, 1999; Reinikka & Collier, 2001). Hutchinson (1999) notes that despite the 
decentralization of health service provision, the impact of decentralization on health 
service delivery and health outcomes is not clear. While decentralization has reportedly 
increased public participation in the health sector, new problems such as the decline in 
childhood immunization coverage demonstrated the difficulties of incorporating formerly 
vertical programs into a decentralized system, particularly if local priorities differed from 
the national ones. Reinikka & Collier (2001) studied the impact of decentralization on the 
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flow of public funds to primary schools in Uganda and found that decentralization 
adversely affected the flow of funds. The schools affected by decentralization received, 
on average, 9 percentage points less of the intended capitation grant per student. 
Although survey results indicated some improvement in input flow such as in teacher 
salaries, they also confirm that serious accountability problems remained in 1995. District 
authorities captured most of the nonwage public funds intended for schools. 
The study by Deininger & Mpuga (2005) provides a general analysis of the extent 
of accountability in decentralized public service delivery in Uganda; However, no 
analysis with respect to decentralized extension is available, most likely due to the 
unavailability of data. 
Altogether these studies contribute to our understanding of the impact of 
decentralized service delivery in the presence of institutional constraints such as local 
capture, limited manpower and corruption. In fact, policy dialogue in Uganda has 
embraced some of these studies’ findings and as a result, some changes have been in 
acted to improve service delivery; although the quality of services (in health and 
education) remains a challenge (Republic of Uganda, 2004b, 2004c, 2004d). 
The present study does not study whether local capture or corruption or 
inadequate manpower affect the NAADS program if at all they do exist; but instead, we 
ask the broader question of what is the impact of access to advisory services under the 
NAADS program. If we find no impact, assuming we have accounted for the potential 
econometric problems, then we may ask whether the absence of impact might be 
attributable to the presence of institutional constraints. The qualitative approaches offer 
some insights on the challenges of the NAADS program. For example, the Joint 
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Assessment Review of Decentralization (JARD) recognized the sluggish integration of 
NAADS activities into local government structures. Some of the local government 
officials do not accord the same weight to NAADS activities as they do to other activities 
(Republic of Uganda, 2005c). This not only affects the overall implementation of 
NAADS, but also its impact. 
This dissertation is based on fieldwork that was carried out in Uganda between 
September 2005 and April 2006. To answer the research question, a household 
questionnaire (see Table A1) integrating household, community and NAADS program 
characteristics as well as a modified agriculture module based on the Living Standards 
Measurement Survey (LSMS) adopted from Reardon & Glewwe (2000a, 2000b) that was 
implemented in selected NAADS and non-NAADS sub-counties in Uganda. Data were 
collected on agricultural outcomes and the factors affecting these outcomes, political 
level indicators of local government performance, farmers’ participation in the local 
electoral process, health and family background characteristics data (including education 
and family size), basic housing and asset data. We study the impact of access to advisory 
services on the value of farm production per acre as the agricultural outcome of interest.  
The value of household production is defined as the value of crop production and the 
value of animals reared per farm land cultivated by the farmer. We expect that controlling 
for other factors, participation into the NAADS program increases the value of household 
production, as a measure of agricultural productivity. 
The survey concentrated on 3 NAADS districts (Treatments) namely Kabale, 
Mukono, and Tororo and 1 non-NAADS district (Control) namely Kayunga (Map 1). The 
NAADS districts were drawn out of the initial six NAADS districts that piloted the 
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NAADS in 2001/2002. Within each NAADS district, one NAADS sub-county was drawn 
out of the initial NAADS sub-counties that begun with the NAADS in 2001/2002. For 
control purposes, the survey was also executed in one non-NAADS sub-county within 
each NAADS district. A total of 305 farmers, 127 of whom are NAADS farmers, were 
interviewed. In addition, to the quantitative survey, qualitative methods were applied 
before and after the survey to address NAADS specific issues. 
The estimation methods are based on instrumental variable (IV) methods to 
estimate the impact of the NAADS on participating farmers. The local government 
assessment indicators are potential candidates for IVs considered in the placement 
decisions. The presumption is that these variables do not affect the agricultural outcome 
of interest. However, we face the problem that some factors that affect the placement 
decision are correlated with the outcome of interest. For example, the agro-potential of 
the sub-county is a candidate in choosing whether a particular sub-county joins NAADS 
or not. 
This study has limitations. In attempting to study the impacts of contract 
extension on improving the livelihoods of the participating farmers, there is a need to go 
beyond the impact on agricultural outcomes. A complete framework would require 
collecting not only agricultural related data, but also consumption and expenditure and 
non-farm enterprise data. This exercise if accomplished can enable the calculation of 
extension impacts on poverty for those participating in the NAADS program. 
Unfortunately, due to time and budget constraints, it was not possible to extend the 
present study to collect consumption and expenditure data. Doing so would imply 
extending the scope of the present study to a large-scale survey. 
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This study found a positive and statistically significant impact of the NAADS 
program on the value of the farm production per acre. Estimation results indicate that 
NAADS has had a 20 percent increase in the value of farm production per acre among 
NAADS farmers. The factors that might help explain this result include: (i) the fact that 
NAADS farmers participate in the local decision making processes governing the 
NAADS program, (ii) the development of farmer institutions aligned to the farmers’ 
investment interests at the village level; (iii) increased knowledge through participatory 
processes; (iv) the ability for farmers to diversify their enterprise choice and the use of 
hybrid crop varieties and animals; and (iv) increased access to practical knowledge and 
skills through localized technology development sites. This finding must be treated with 
caution. Our study did not account for spillover effects, other general equilibrium effects, 
and we might have applied weak instruments. Further research will be required to 
validate our results. 
Despite the positive impact of NAADS on the value of farm production per acre, 
we find that there are factors outside of the NAADS program and those inherent in the 
current system of NAADS that might impede further gains from NAADS program. The 
NAADS program faces challenges inherent in Uganda’s decentralized structure; 
particularly the lack of adequate financial resources, low human capacity and inadequate 
monitoring of government programmes. In addition, the program suffers from the lack of 
competent individual PSPs, and a need to strengthen farmers’ institutions. There are also 
problems of inadequate funding from the central government as well as delays in 
disbursement of financial resources, particularly at the local level. 
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The key policy messages for the government of Uganda are the need to strengthen 
farmer institutions through provision of relevant training to strengthen farmer 
empowerment. There is need for a comprehensive marketing strategy that works 
alongside NAADS to improve the marketing chain so that farmers understand farming as 
a business.  There is urgent need for a clear policy guideline for local government support 
to NAADS activities and increased coordination of NAADS activities among the relevant 
line ministries. The policy guideline should clearly consider the mechanisms to improve 
local fiscal capacity and thus, the co-financing obligations of local governments. There is 
need to strengthen the skills of existing service providers through training problems; 
however, there is need to be aware of the PSP turnover problem and how to minimize it. 
 
Organization of the study 
The rest of the study is organized as follows: Chapter 2 reviews the literature on 
decentralization of agricultural extension and also describes the implementation of the 
NAADS program. Emphasis is laid on the role of the farmers, sub-county authorities and 
PSPs in the implementation of the NAADS programs at the sub-county level. Chapter 3 
presents the methodology applied to generate the data used for analysis. Chapter 4 
presents both the quantitative and qualitative empirical findings. We begin by presenting 
the quantitative results, and then present the qualitative results. Chapter 5 summarizes the 
empirical findings and discusses their policy implications in the implementation of the 
NAADS program. 
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CHAPTER TWO. DECENTRALIZED APPROACHES TO AGRICULTURAL 
EXTENSION 
 
 
Introduction 
The goal of this chapter is to review the relationships between decentralization 
and agricultural extension and to discuss how the NAADS program works. We draw 
upon the central government (principal)-local government and farmer’s organizations 
(supervisors)-PSP (agent) conceptual framework to describe the design and operation of 
the NAADS as a decentralized agricultural advisory services provision program. 
Agro-based developing countries are increasingly implementing decentralized, 
demand-driven participatory approaches to agricultural extension service delivery that 
put the farmers (clients) at the forefront (Chapman & Tripp, 2003; World Bank., 2005a). 
This gradual shift away from publicly funded/publicly provided extension toward 
publicly funded/privately provided extension, also known as contract extension, is a 
response in the search for service delivery mechanisms that are not only cost-effective, 
but also more responsive to the beneficiaries of the programs (Rivera & Zijp, 2002; 
Rivera, Zijp, & Alex, 2002).8 This is similar to the argument for decentralization in the 
public finance literature. 
During the 1970s and 1980s, there was little potential for producer organizations 
(POs) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to be involved in the development 
process (World Bank., 2000a). In addition, local governments could not provide public 
services such as agricultural services because the authority and financing needed to do so 
                                                 
8 In this study we use extension to mean agricultural extension. 
  
20
 
were with centralized government agencies. More generally, the traditional central 
extension systems were not responsive to the needs of different types of farmers, not 
accountable to farmers and included little or no farmer participation and were 
unsustainable (Anderson & Hoff, 1993; Antholt, 1998; Feder & Slade, 1993). 
More recently, the roles of the state are changing with sub-national governments, 
private sector, POs, NGOs, and Community-Based Organizations (CBOs) involved in the 
execution of decentralized contract extension programs. The shift is in sharp contrast to 
the traditional view that equated public goods to government provision (Besley & 
Ghatak, 2006). 
In countries with decentralized extension systems (e.g., Chile, Estonia, Uganda, 
and Venezuela) the central government continues to fund extension programs at least 
during the early years of implementation and usually delegates the operations of 
extension through semi-autonomous agencies charged with extension services (World 
Bank., 2005a). In addition, the central government puts in place an enabling environment 
in terms of macroeconomic stability, provision of technical and regulatory structures and 
coordinating strategies for poverty reduction (Farrington, 1995; Farrington, Christoplos, 
Kidd, & Beckman, 2002; Hubbard, 1995). 
However, the private sector (both for profit and not-for profit) NGOs and CBOs 
are increasingly involved in the provision of extension services through contracting. It is 
recognized that NGOs/CBOs can be effective in reaching poor communities and remote 
areas at low cost, as they may be more inclined to identify local needs and promote 
participation, and that engaging these grassroots based organizations in projects and 
policy dialogue can improve project design, implementation and sustainability (World 
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Bank., 2005a). The reasons explaining why the NGOs/CBOs may have the incentive to 
be more responsive include their long experience working with rural communities or the 
desire to accomplish their parent organizations mandates, including fighting rural 
poverty. 
Because local governments are closer to the communities, they have better 
knowledge about local conditions. This feature is central to local government functions 
under contract extension arrangements. Local governments play several roles ranging 
from administration to monitoring and supervision to co-financing extension to 
mobilization and sensitization of the farmers. The POs (for example, farmers groups) are 
the clients whose roles have become even more complex than  before ranging from 
demand for specific advisory and information services tailored to local conditions to 
producers of information to co-financiers of extension to monitors to planners, to mention 
a few of the roles of the POs. The major benefit from decentralizing agricultural 
extension is the empowerment of producers to express their demands for technological 
innovation (World Bank., 2000b). However, as emphasized by the World Bank (2001) 
Agricultural Knowledge and Information Systems (AKIS) review, mere decentralization 
of extension to local governments does not guarantee that beneficiaries will have more 
control over the decision making process. 
Contracting out of extension services is expected to increase institutional 
efficiency in providing agricultural advisory services. The expected economic gains such 
as raising the proportion of the poor out of poverty through increased incomes rests on 
adapting extension to specific regional or local conditions and on the political appeal of 
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increased participation in local governance (de Janvry, Sadoulet, & Murgai, 2002; Oates, 
1999; Shah, 2004). 
Amidst this shift, however, decentralized and contract extension systems face 
challenges that may impede the expected gains (Ahmad, Devarajan, Khemani, & Shah, 
2005; Bahiigwa, Rigby, & Woodhouse, 2005; Chapman & Tripp, 2003; Ellis & 
Bahiigwa, 2003; Farrington et al., 2002; Ramirez & Quarry, 2004). Financial resources, 
governance and capacity constraints at the sub-national levels of government can affect 
the sub-national governments’ roles including mobilization, co-financing, supervision, 
and monitoring of extension service delivery. Faced with such challenges, local 
governments struggle to define how they will prioritize the use of their resources in 
relation to their expanded responsibilities (Farrington et al., 2002). An adequate transfer 
of resources must accompany administrative decentralization, so that local governments 
have the fiscal resources needed to carry out decentralized functions effectively. Political 
decentralization is also necessary, as it leads to better accountability and governance 
reforms at the local level.  In addition, Farrington et al. ( 2002) point out that a privatized 
extension system will only function if farmers are capable of articulating their needs, 
enforcing contracts with PSPs and evaluating PSPs services. 
There is growing literature on decentralized and contract extension based on 
reviews of case-studies (Rivera et al., 2002; World Bank., 2005a). But there is little 
survey-based analysis on the impacts of the decentralized approach to service provision. 
Recent evidence on evaluating decentralized extension programs include Feder, Murgai, 
& Quizon, (2004a, 2004b); Godtland, Sadoulet, de Janvry, Murgai, and Ortiz ( 2004);and 
Labarta-Chávarri, (2005). All three studies analyze the impact of the Farmer Field School 
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(FFS) approach to agricultural extension; an approach whose implementation is at the 
lower levels of government. Farmers are trained in specialized skills such as Integrated 
Pest Management (IPM) methods and improved farming methods to raise agricultural 
productivity. There are few evaluations available with respect to the “new contract 
extension” approaches. The author is aware of the recent evaluation of the NAADS 
program (Benin et al., 2005) whose methodology is similar to the one used in this study. 
However, our analysis differs in sense that our study accounts for self-selection into the 
NAADS program as well as the non-random placement. In addition, we ask what 
explains participation into the NAADS program as well as the question of whether 
farmers are satisfied with the quality of extension services provided by PSPs. 
The next sub-sections are structured as follows. The next section reviews the 
evidence on agricultural extension, particularly those approaches that did not embrace 
decentralization. We then review country case study evidence on decentralized 
agricultural extension. The goal of the review is twofold: first, to underscore the role of 
sub-counties in decentralized extension programs and second, to understand the 
challenges that previous evaluations of extension impacts have faced. Sub-section 2.4 
presents the discussion of how the NAADS program works. The chapter concludes with 
the lessons about what needs to be done to implement and/or analyze the impact of a 
decentralized extension program. 
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Prior to decentralized extension approaches 
 
 Antholt's (1998) review on public extension systems around the 
developing world reveals that owing to the backlog of technology yet to reach farmers in 
the 1970s, the need for better management of extension programs emerged. By the mid-
1970s many agricultural extension systems had been built with inadequate attention paid 
to the skill and support problems faced by the extensionists (Birkhaeuser & Evenson, 
1991). Consequently, the effectiveness of the extension agents in assisting the farmers 
was limited. In addition, very few studies of agricultural extension impacts on farm 
productivity, technology adoption, and farmer knowledge had been done prior to 1970 
(Evenson, 2001; Evenson & Mwabu, 2001). 
The concept of management of extension was the pillar of the Training and Visit 
(T and V) system that was first introduced in 1967 in Turkey (Benor, 1987). Under the T 
and V system, extension agents met with selected “contact” farmers or farmer groups and 
followed a regular schedule for visits. The extension agents also met with their colleagues 
and supervisors at the regional level to discuss problems and their solutions (Antholt, 
1998). The system required extension agents to have two primary duties: first, to transfer 
agricultural information to farmers and second, to report farmers’ problems to the central 
government -based extension offices. Management education was a secondary objective. 
Unlike the earlier extension systems of the 1970s, the T and V approach allowed for 
better communication between researchers and extensionists. 
Using the T and V model, the World Bank increased its support of agricultural 
extension systems to about 3 billion U.S. dollars by 1989 (Anderson, Feder, & Ganguly, 
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2006; Antholt, 1998). A comprehensive assessment of the T and V system in 107 World 
Bank-funded projects over the period 1977 and 1992 showed that farmer participation in 
the different stages of the program design was limited; there were deficiencies in relevant 
technologies, and inadequate funding (World Bank, 1994). In addition, there were 
concerns of over-staffed programs, lack of sustainability, lack of clientele ownership, and 
generally lack of a bottom-up approach to extension.  As a result, the T and V program 
was not results oriented. The evidence of the T and V system impacts in Asia (e.g., from 
Punjab in Pakistan to Nepal to Thailand to Indonesia to India,) mostly revealed no impact 
on agricultural outcomes (Antholt, 1998). 
The evidence from sub-Saharan Africa is almost similar to that in Asia. However, 
the results must be interpreted with caution due to the methodological differences and 
challenges that the impact evaluators faced. Differences in data, initial conditions and 
survey methodologies as well as susceptibility to microeconometric problems (namely, 
measurement errors, self-selection, and omitted variable bias) confront the existing 
empirical studies so much that one can claim the results to be mixed. An example 
illustrating these challenges is that of the studies on the impact of the T and V system in 
Kenya. On the one hand, Bindlish & Evenson (1993) and Evenson & Mwabu (2001) 
found the returns to extension to be high. On the other hand, Gautam & Anderson (1999) 
found no impact of the T and V extension services. Perhaps the discussion by 
Birkhaeuser & Evenson (1991) and Evenson (2001) can settle the debate. These authors 
discuss the econometric and evaluation challenges and note that despite their prevalence 
and the availability of econometric procedures to address them, rarely have they been 
addressed in empirical studies. Studies on extension impact at the individual farm level 
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using a farm-level measure of extension may suffer from the problem of endogeneity in 
extension farmer interactions and the problem of indirect or secondary information flows. 
Endogeneity arises in any of the three forms namely, omitted variables, measurement 
errors, and self-selection (Wooldridge, 2002). 
Treating the extension variable as exogenous may not be correct. It is possible 
that some unobserved characteristics of certain farmers drive them into seeking out 
information about changing farm conditions or new technologies (Birkhaeuser & 
Evenson, 1991). Such farmers may be inclined to attend more demonstration days, read 
more literature, and seek out extension contact. Analogously, extension agents may seek 
out contacts with better or rich farmers who would be good performers even in the 
absence of extension contacts. Failure to take this type of endogeneity into account leads 
to upward biases of the extension impact. Similarly, difficulties associated with 
measurement error of the extension variable (s) and the failure to control for certain 
variables such as farmer managerial or organizational abilities can result in inconsistent 
estimates. 
The problem of indirect or secondary information flows arises where knowledge 
that originates from extension contacts is passed on to other farmers who do not directly 
interact with extension personnel (Birkhaeuser & Evenson, 1991). The presence of inter-
farmer communications tend to cause an understatement of extension effects when the 
approach of defining extension impact by the number of direct contact is used. The 
problem highlighted above can be effectively solved, or at least reduced in severity, when 
the extension variable is specified at a village or area level. This variable is then 
exogenous to individual households and internalizes the inter-farmer communications. 
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An example of a recent study that tries to address some of the above problems is 
that by Owens, Hoddinott, & Kinsey (2003) in their study of extension impacts on farm 
productivity using a panel sample of households residing in three resettlement areas of 
rural Zimbabwe. They estimate the extension effects on the value of crop production per 
hectare, with and without controls for unobservable household level fixed effects. 
Differencing rids the specification of the correlation between extension and the 
disturbance term. Upon controlling for innate productivity characteristics and farmer’s 
ability using household fixed effects estimation, the study finds that access to agricultural 
extension services, defined as receiving one or two visits per agricultural year, raises the 
value of crop production by about 15 percent. 
Having reviewed the problems faced by past extension systems as well as the 
challenges that evaluators face, we now review selected evidence on the decentralized 
extension approaches. 
 
A review of decentralized extension programs 
 
Because of the complex policy environment within which agricultural extension 
operates, a review of country case studies along a single policy dimension is difficult.9 
For example, China’s extension reform is not limited to decentralization and contracting, 
but also includes demand driven approaches and producer organizations, among others. 
In addition, several other reforms are undertaken; making the reform process complex to 
                                                 
9 Policies for extension reform include decentralization, privatization, contracting, commercialized services, 
cost sharing/recovery, public-partnerships, role of NGOs, use of information, communication  and 
technology (ICT), participatory approaches, demand-driven programs, producer organizations, national 
strategies, among others (Rivera & Zijp, eds., 2002). 
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analyze. A similar situation is depicted in other countries implementing agricultural 
extension reforms. Despite this complexity, a review of world-wide experiences with 
extension approaches can help researchers better understand the role of local 
governments and PSPs in decentralized extension provision. 
The decentralization of extension to local governments where the center retains 
both the financing and delivery has been undertaken by several Latin American 
governments with a view of improving accountability and local political commitment 
since extension agents work closer to their clientele (Anderson & Feder, 2003). Rivera 
(1996) notes that decentralization of extension was driven by structural reform to 
improve institutional responsiveness and accountability, fiscal decentralization and the 
need for farmer participatory involvement in decision making and management of 
extension. 
Early studies on decentralization of agricultural extension have, however 
questioned concerns over issues such as accountability, relevance and quality of 
extension provided by the service providers (Garfield, Guadagni, & Moreau, 1997; 
Malvicini, 1996). Other challenges include the financial sustainability and the linkage of 
extension with research (Anderson & Feder, 2003). 
Fee-for-service and privatized extension are yet another set of approaches where 
small groups of farmers typically contract extension services to address their specific 
information needs. The provision of extension may be a public entity or private firm or 
consultant but the financing is largely public. Under such arrangements the challenges 
include the group knowledge of their information needs and their ability to assess the 
quality of the services received. A drawback of this approach is that less commercial 
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farmers (i.e., poorer farmers and those farming smaller and less favored areas) may 
purchase little or no information at all (Anderson & Feder, 2003). 
The farmer field school (FFS) approach is yet another decentralized extension 
program. The FFS was originally introduced in Asia and involves educating farmer 
participants on a variety of practices such as agro-ecosystems and integrated pest 
management (Anderson & Feder, 2003; Farrington, 1995). It entails farmer 
experimentation and non-formal training to a group of 20-25 farmers during a single 
crop-growing season. Some farmers are equipped with additional skills to become farmer 
trainers. This approach is expected to improve accountability and the quality of services 
provided to the farmers. However, some evidence from Indonesia and the Philippines 
revealed that these approaches may not ensure financial sustainability and the outreach 
may be limited due to high costs of training the farmers (Quizon, Feder, & Murgai, 2001; 
Rola, Jamias, & Quizon, 2002). Recent evidence by Feder et al.(2004b) reveal similar 
challenges. 
With reference to decentralized contract extension system, the only available 
evidence is based on reviews of case studies. In the mid-1990s in Estonia, a national 
agricultural advisory service program and a new advisory subsidy scheme were 
established as a response to the problems (e.g., insufficient management) of the old 
extension system (Loolaid, 2000). Different contract arrangements serving different 
needs were designed.10 The evidence from Estonia’s advisory program include better 
                                                 
10 For example, the subsidized individual agricultural services contracts involve legally registered farmers 
and certified advisers as direct partners and the county administration as an indirect partner charged with 
the responsibility of management, financing, and accounting of contracts for farmers in their county 
jurisdictions. Other contracting arrangements include contracts for providing extension services for farmers 
in a group approach; contracts for development projects to provide training, support services and extension 
to groups of farmers; and contracts for the design of legislative framework, administration and financing of 
delivery of advisory and extension services. 
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access to advisory services and information to farmers, practical approach by advisers to 
provide information and train farmers, and developed local capacity. However, despite 
the achievements, extension is yet to be demand-driven (farmers have lacked economic, 
marketing, and legal knowledge). Other challenges include insufficient management 
capability at the county level and complex contract procedures. Similar challenges are 
faced by Honduras’s Fondo Para Productores de Ladera (FPPL), a publicly 
funded/private extension system where a significant administrative effort is required to 
protect the contractual integrity (including enforcing contracts and preventing abuses) 
with the PSPs. 
Prior to 1991, the Livestock Production Extension (LPE) in Mali was 
unresponsive to the producer’s demands until contracting out began in three livestock 
regions of Sikasso, Kayes and Mopti (Quinet-Fermet & Gauthier, 2000). The government 
decentralized, privatized and restructured its agricultural services. Mali’s networks of 
private veterinarians and paraveterinarians transformed information on livestock, and 
producer participation through producer organizations and regional agricultural chambers 
have contributed to improvements in livestock advice, vaccination, and environment 
management. A notable scheme is the village extension voucher system where less than 
20 U.S. dollars is allocated per village through the farmers. This money is used to 
contract private agents. The village extension vouchers have improved the empowerment 
of the producers, transferred part of the control to the beneficiaries and allowed for 
competition among private agents. In addition, the cost of the program is said to be low to 
the government. 
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Table 1 summarizes additional evidence on decentralization or privatization of 
extension drawn from Rivera & Zijp (2002). The review illustrates that 
decentralized/privatized extensions face challenges that may impede the expected gains 
such as poverty reduction through increase in house incomes and food security resulting 
from increased agricultural productivity. At the same time, compared with the traditional 
extension systems, there is hope that improved extension service delivery through 
decentralized approaches will result into better agricultural outcomes and thus raise the 
incomes of the poor. That said, drawing upon empirical evidence from Uganda’s NAADS 
may contribute to our understanding of how to improve the efficiency in financing and 
provision of agricultural extension services. 
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Table 1. A summary on extent of decentralization/privatization and quality of extension in selected case studies 
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Author Country Extent of extension 
decentralization 
Local governance 
and quality of 
extension 
Possible reasons for state of quality of 
extension 
(Amezah & Hesse, 2002) Ghana • In 1997, the Ministry of Food 
and Agriculture (MOFA) decided 
to decentralize operations to 
achieve more responsiveness and 
effectiveness in service delivery. 
• However, the process was more 
of deconcentration 
 
• There were claims that the 
quality of specialized 
services such as 
veterinary, plant 
regulatory, and 
agricultural statistics 
services was 
compromised. 
• Mainstreaming cocoa 
extension within MOFA 
extension system is 
claimed to have 
contributed to decline in 
quality of cocoa 
extension. 
• Incomplete decentralization. This meant that agricultural 
extension activities have not yet been incorporated into the 
plans and budget of the district assemblies and remain within 
MOFA’s authority and responsibility 
(Seepersad & Vernon, 2004) Trinidad and 
Tobago 
• Extension was decentralized, 
but not enough authority was 
delegated to the regional and 
county offices. 
• Farmers seem not to have 
been served in a 
participatory manner and 
the quality of extension 
was inadequate. 
• As noted by Carpenter (2000) there has been a history of 
controversy regarding the administration of decentralized 
extension services. 
(Saviroff & Lindarte, 2002) Venezuela • In 1995, a new agricultural 
extension program was 
established that placed key 
responsibility for implementing 
extension programs at the local 
municipality and established 
producer associations to assist 
local authorities manage 
extension. 
• The establishment of municipal 
agricultural extension offices 
• With decentralized 
extension, the quality of 
extension services is 
much better than when 
extension was centralized. 
• The capacity of service 
providers has improved 
and there is greater 
community /farmer 
participation is higher 
than before. 
• Although the program has posted several achievements, lower 
level governments co-financing is still too low and they claim 
that it is due to lack of central government support for the 
decentralization process. 
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enabled a bottom-up program 
formulation. 
(Hanson, Lainez, Smyle, & Daiz, 
2004) 
Honduras • A privatized system of 
extension with private 
companies contracted to work 
with the farmers. 
• Each village develops a 
proposal identifying the goals 
they want to accomplish in the 
upcoming year. Private 
companies work with villages 
in a participatory manner to 
implement the plan. 
• Villages choose from a broad 
range of areas or services. 
• The technology transfer 
component is said to have 
been a success. Over 
8,900 farmers above the 
targeted 6,500 farmers 
were served. 
• There was continuity in 
projects that started in first 
year. Out of 51 first year 
projects, 38 had been 
completed and continued in 
the second year. 
• Except for agricultural 
diversification and contour 
retention ditches, private 
companies far exceeded 
their planned for specific 
activities in both year one 
and two. 
• The  participatory extension approach may have accounted 
for a large measure of the success of this project in years one 
and two. 
• But to better serve the farmers, they need to be more involved 
in evaluating the private companies. 
• The need for significant administrative effort to protect the 
contractual integrity. 
• And government needs to provide and supervise training of 
the private companies. 
 
Source: summarized from (Rivera & Zijp, 2002).
  
35
 
How the NAADS program works 
 
Uganda’s NAADS was created as a semi-autonomous institution by Act of 
Parliament in November 2001 and charged with the objective of revamping Uganda’s 
agricultural productivity through the provision of decentralized, demand-driven and 
privately-provided advisory services to the farmers (Republic of Uganda, 2000c). The 
NAADS secretariat oversees all NAADS activities in Uganda. These activities include 
but are not limited to financial management, development of farmer institutions, and 
monitoring and evaluation. 
At its inception, six districts, namely, Arua, Kabale, Kibaale, Mukono, Soroti and 
Tororo were selected to pilot the NAADS. By 2005, the NAADS had covered 37 districts 
in 344 sub-counties in Uganda (Republic of Uganda, 2005c). The program rolls out to 
new districts and sub-counties on a fiscal year basis in line with Uganda’s budget cycle 
and accounting framework, the Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF). It is 
expected that NAADS will cover the entire country by 2008 (Republic of Uganda, 
2005a). 
The specific objectives of the NAADS program include increasing effectiveness, 
efficiency and sustainability of the extension delivery services, increasing farmers’ access 
to and sustaining knowledge, information and communication, and increasing access to 
and sustaining effective and efficient productivity enhancing technologies to farmers. The 
NAADS program is built on the principles of farmer empowerment and participation, 
decentralization, cost-sharing, a publicly-financed/privately-provided extension system 
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and embraces linkages with environment, gender, health, research, education and 
extension (Republic of Uganda, 2005c). 
 
The placement decision 
 
The NAADS program is presently a targeted, whereby some districts and sub-
counties participate and others do not (Figure 1).11 Furthermore, within a participating 
district, not all sub-counties participate and similarly, within participating sub-counties, 
not all farmers participate. Some farmers choose not to participate even if they are 
eligible and some who are ineligible choose to participate. It is decentralized in the sense 
that implementation is through local government structures, particularly the sub-counties, 
which are the lowest local program administrative units in Uganda’s decentralized system 
of governance. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
11 Over time non-participating sub-counties and districts join the NAADS program. By 2008, it is planned 
that NAADS will be covering the entire country. 
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FIGURE 1: DESCRIPTION OF THE NAADS COVERAGE IN UGANDA 
 
 
Source: Author 
 
The factors that explain the NAADS program placement include performance 
indicators based on the government’s Poverty Action Fund (PAF) and the Local 
Government Development Project (LGDP), and NAADS specific criteria.12 The 
minimum conditions for qualification and participation by districts and sub-counties in 
the NAADS include the availability of a three-year rolling development/investment plan 
approved by the district, an annual budget approved by the district including planned 
                                                 
12 One would suspect that political factors might contribute toward selection into the NAADS program. Our 
discussions with officials at the NAADS did not reveal existence of political pressures to include particular 
districts and or sub-counties in the NAADS program. This is a typical unobservable, whose effects on 
placement decisions are unknown to the modeler. 
Farmers self-select in/out of NAADS 
2 nd level of program placement 
1 st level of program placement 
NAADS sub-
counties 
Non-NAADS 
sub-counties 
NAADS districts Non-NAADS districts 
NAADS farmers Non-NAADS farmers 
Districts in Uganda 
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investments, and a below budget line for sub-county investments and human capacity to 
manage the program (Republic of Uganda, 2000c, 2001a). 
Other than the decentralization-related criteria, other requirements include 
agricultural potential such as the rainfall level and distribution, altitude, soil type and 
depth, topography, presence of pests and diseases, and presence of irrigation that 
influences the production of agricultural commodities. 
 
Financing of the NAADS program 
 
The NAADS program has a vision for 25 years (Republic of Uganda, 2000c, 
2001a). The first phase begun in the fiscal year 2001/2002 and will end in 2007/2008 
(Republic of Uganda, 2000c). The cost of the first phase is estimated at about 108 million 
U.S. dollars. The main sources of the funds are donors, government of Uganda, 
participating local governments and participating farmers. The program is funded from a 
common basket to which participating stakeholders channel their contributions. The 
donors provide about 80 percent of the NAADS budget followed by the government of 
Uganda with a contribution of 8 percent. The local governments and farmers associations 
contribute 10 percent and 2 percent respectively. 
The financing of extension in the NAADS sub-counties is through three sources. 
First, conditional transfers are determined by the NAADS secretariat based on a district 
resource allocation formula. The participating districts and sub-counties receive 
conditional transfers (specific for NAADS activities) from the central government, 
through the financial coordination of the NAADS secretariat and the Ministry of Finance, 
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Planning and Economic Development (MFPED). The funds are released on a quarterly 
basis to the participating districts’ NAADS accounts. The participating districts transfer 
the funds to the participating NAADS sub-counties accounts at the district. Of the 
NAADS total budget, about 77 percent is targeted to the sub-counties. Further, 72 percent 
of the total NAADS budget is directed towards the advisory and information services 
component, 65 percent of which is targeted to the sub-counties. 
Second, local-governments (districts and sub-counties) are supposed to co-finance 
NAADS (see Chapter One). The local governments raise this portion through local 
revenue (local taxes or fees). Finally, NAADS participating farmers are expected to co-
finance the program by paying τ  shillings per annum.13 Each participating farmers’ 
group is expected to pay annual farmers’ co-funding contributions toward the NAADS 
program. 
Annual group contributions range between 2.8 to 16.7 U.S. dollars.14 Payment per 
member depends on group membership, typically ranging between 10 to 20 members 
(NAADS, 2005b-monitoring database). 
 
The role of sub-counties in NAADS activities 
 
In this section we discuss the role of sub-county authorities under NAADS using 
the perspective of a hierarchical model of organizational theory. Figure 2 shows a 
                                                 
13 Assume a fraction r of the sub-county population to be NAADS farmers. Assume N farmers’ groups 
within a sub-county with each farmers’ group comprising n farmers such that .nNr = The NAADS 
farmers within the sub-county are required to co-finance the NAADS in the amount of .τ  However, the 
non-NAADS farmers do not. Each farmers’ group contributes .N
τφ =  Each farmer is required to pay a 
fixed amount f, then nf=φ and thus .rfnfN ==τ  
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simplified representation of the NAADS implementation design within a participating 
sub-county.15 We only assume a single principal, supervisory board and single agent for 
exposition purposes. This assumption enables us to delineate the roles of the sub-counties 
and PSPs from the perspective of a simple Principal-Supervisor-Agent model. 
 
FIGURE 2. SIMPLIFIED REPRESENTATION OF THE NAADS PROGRAM 
 
Source: Author 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
14 The conversion we use here is 1 U.S. dollar = 1,800 Uganda Shillings. 
15 A detailed NAADS program design is contained in the 2004/2005 NAADS revised implementation 
guidelines. In this exposition we omit the details at the district and national level where a structure similar 
to that of the sub-county NAADS ‘supervisory board’ exists. Both levels play important roles in 
supervision and in the program placement decisions. Here we concentrate on the details at the sub-county 
level, the main level of program implementation closer to the program beneficiaries. 
PRINCIPAL (NAADS secretariat)
District
Sub-county officials
Elected farmers’ representatives
SUPERVISORY BOARD-sub-county
AGENT-
BENEFICIARES-farmers
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The central government through the NAADS secretariat (principal) delegates the 
overall implementation of NAADS activities to the sub-county. The sub-county 
authorities in conjunction with farmers’ representatives sub-contract PSPs (agent) who 
are expected to deliver according to the contractual obligations to serve the demands of 
advisory services for the beneficiaries-the participating farmers. The PSPs may be 
individuals or firms (including NGOs). The selection criteria for NGOs is coordinated at 
the district (Republic of Uganda, 2000b, 2001a) but the procurement committee at the 
sub-county selects the NGOs. 
The thick circle denotes the registered NAADS farmers’ groups. The dotted circle 
denotes the elected farmers’ representatives from each farmers’ group who form the sub-
county farmer’s forum. At the sub-county level, sub-county authorities (here we include 
the NAADS sub-coordinator since like the sub-county chief, he/she is paid by the center) 
and the elected farmers’ representatives run the NAADS activities, although practically 
there are variations on the involvement of sub-county authorities in NAADS activities. 
The light arrows denote the flow of directives or funds from the upper tier to the 
lower tier for execution of NAADS activities. The dark arrows denote the NAADS 
reporting mechanisms. For example, the PSP is supposed to report to the farmers and the 
farmers must confirm or sign that they have received the services from the PSP. Along 
the vertical structure, the PSP is also supposed to report to the sub-county, who in turn 
are supposed to report to the districts and eventually to the NAADS secretariat. 
The dark double pointed arrow emphasizes the role of farmers’ groups in aspects 
such as empowerment and also the crucial role of sub-counties in not only facilitating 
contractual obligations including monitoring and supervision, but in the mobilization 
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efforts for the formation of farmers’ groups. Monitoring of the NAADS is a responsibility 
of all stakeholders. Ideally the farmers are expected to provide feedback on the quality of 
advisory services received. The farmers’ representatives are expected to monitor NAADS 
projects and provide feedback to farmers and to the sub-county level. The sub-county 
authorities (especially the sub-county chief), NAADS sub-county coordinator and 
NAADS farmers’ representatives at the sub-county are charged with the overall 
administration, management and coordination functions of NAADS activities. 
We return to Figure 2 to discuss possible incentive problems; for now let us 
understand the role of the sub-counties in farmers’ institutional development.16 The 
essence of the farmers’ groups is to facilitate collective decision making processes based 
on a bottom-up participatory approach to the strengthening of farmers’ voices and power 
to demand for appropriate extension services. Members of a farmers’ group are expected 
to have a common farming interest. Each group has an address and a leadership structure 
with elected members. Through participatory approaches farmers’ groups identify the 
problems they face, participate in planning, mobilize internal resources, and engage in 
enterprise selection based on guided evaluations that incorporate cost-benefit analysis. 
Overall it is expected that strengthening farmer organizations will improve their 
knowledge and skills on issues such as record keeping, group financial mobilization and 
credit access and management as well as marketing to operate agricultural as a business. 
The sub-county farmers’ forum (SFF) is made up of farmers’ representatives of 
all the farmers’ groups in the sub-county. It provides a mechanism through which farmers 
discuss finance budgets and provision arrangements of advisory services including the 
election of their representatives, decisions on strategic enterprises and technologies to 
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invest in and choosing from a pool of PSPs. In addition, the SFF is expected to monitor 
and evaluate the services of the PSPs. A key feature of the sub-county farmers’ forum 
(SFF) is that elected farmers’ representatives are supposed to be benevolent; so is entire 
the sub-county local leadership. 
The formation of the SFF follows a sequence of events, each in turn. First, a 
workshop is organized at the sub-county level to sensitize the sub-county leadership 
about the NAADS program. At this time the sub-county leadership gets to know their 
responsibilities with respect to the NAADS program. To initiate the process of the SFF 
formation, a list of existing farmer groups in the sub-county is complied by the sub-
county leadership.17 
Next, the sub-county chief and his local leadership invite farmers in the sub-
county to attend a meeting at the sub-county headquarters. During this meeting the 
farmers’ representatives from the different groups are elected to the interim SFF. Those 
invited to attend include at least one to three farmers from each of the existing groups, 
one farmer from each parish who is not yet a member of a farmers group; and women, 
youth and people with disabilities. 
The criteria for the election of the 15 member SFF include: at least one 
representative from each parish; one farmer must represent farmers of the same interest; 
at least 4 members of the SFF should be women; one youth and one representative of the 
economically active people with disabilities. Councilors are not eligible for election to 
                                                                                                                                                 
16 A detailed account of this discussion is contained in the 2004/2005 NAADS implementation guideline. 
17 The Sub-county leadership includes sub-county NAADS coordinator, Community Development Officer 
and other extension workers existing in the sub-county (NAADS, 2004/2005b). 
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the SFF. Both the secretary for production and the sub-county NAADS coordinator are 
part of the SFF. 
The rules at the polls include: the sub-county chief is the returning officer; prior to 
selection, consensus is reached on whether to vote by show of hands, lining behind 
candidates, or by secret ballot; group participants elect by the parish they come from and 
one representative must be elected to represent a particular parish; from those elected in 
the first round, a chairperson is elected based on his profile including his communication, 
inter personal and mobilization abilities. Three of the members of the SFF are elected by 
the elected SFF to the procurement committee that awards contracts for NAADS advisory 
services or goods. Until this point the SFF is interim, because it is composed of members 
who are drawn from groups which have not yet been registered. Further, the SFF may 
still comprise farmers who do not belong to any farmers’ groups. After one year, the 
substantive SFF are elected to serve 3 years, renewable for one more term only. 
The community based facilitators (CBFs) and the recently established Parish 
Coordinating Committees (PCCs) have been added to assist in sub-county NAADS 
activities. Imagine a sub-county having over 100 farmers’ groups in NAADS with each 
represented by two elected members at the SFF meetings. This situation demands a lot of 
sub-county leadership to manage the proceedings on NAADS implementation. The PCCs 
have been created to provide support to the sub-county in this implementation. 
Relevant for our modeling of the participation decision is the impact of local 
governance factors in explaining who participates in NAADS? Second, how to get 
farmers who do not belong to the farmers’ groups at the time of the sensitization to attend 
at least the first meeting about NAADS (presumably through the local radio and local 
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NGOs)? Third, how far does the local political leadership disseminate the sensitization 
information (who gets to know and when)? Fourth, the perceptions of a farmer about the 
sub-county leadership and group work might affect his/her decisions to participate in the 
NAADS program. 
 
The role of s (PSPs) in NAADS activities 
 
Unlike the traditional public extension programs, service provision under 
decentralized contract extension is contracted out to PSPs. Under the NAADS program, 
the PSPs are expected to deliver according to the contractual obligations in the 
Memorandum of Understandings (MoUs) signed at the sub-county. The PSPs may be 
firms or individuals. They may also be NGOs. A procurement committee (PC) composed 
of farmers’ representatives meets and vets applications of potential PSPs for the selected 
enterprises. The enterprises may range from procurement of advisory services on 
improved crop growing and animal rearing methods to establishment of Technology 
Demonstration Sites (TDS) (e.g., Irish Storage or piggery units) for demonstrating better 
methods of farming to physical provision of seeds (e.g., hybrid ground nuts, Irish potato 
seed) or supply of hybrid animals (e.g., hybrid cross (e.g., goats, pigs, bulls). The contract 
specifies the target group of beneficiaries, duration of contract, specification of items 
procured, contract value and mode of payment, and other administrative procedures that 
the contracting parties must abide with. 
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Conclusion 
 
The implementation of contract extension in Uganda has created a platform for 
empowerment of the farmers. However, the above review and that based on the NAADS 
implementation progress reveal the complexities involved in advisory services provision 
under decentralized contract extension programs. For example, while some PSPs are 
commended for the services they endeavor to provide to the farmers, other PSPs’ services 
are below the required standard. In our study sites there are instances in which PSPs do 
well on delivering contracted extension services (e.g., the Irish storage in Kyanamira sub-
county, Kabale districts, the piggery project in Kasawo sub-county, Mukono district, and, 
Kisoko sub-county, Tororo district). At the same time, there are cases where the PSPs 
perform poorly on contracted extension services (e.g., the cases of poultry projects in 
Kasawo and Kisoko sub-counties). Furthermore, there is variation in the pro-activeness 
of farmers’ groups to discipline the PSPs who fail to deliver according to the contractual 
obligations. Farmers in Bukinda sub-county, Kabale district, provide an example of 
strong farmers’ institutions in protecting contractual integrity: they terminated a contract 
with a PSP due to poor quality services. 
Despite the efforts by the NAADS secretariat to implement quality assurance, 
regulation and technical auditing of services, there are other institutional challenges that 
constrain the capacity building efforts of the PSPs. For example, the “de-layering” of 
public extension officers to create a competitive market with a pool of competent PSPs 
has been delayed by the Ministry of Public Service.18 
                                                 
18 ‘De-layering’ is a term used to refer to having public extension officers relinquished of their duties as 
public officers; but with an implicit meaning that those retrenched/de-layered are re-trainable to join the 
pool of PSPs. 
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Another challenge is that it is much easier to crosscheck from sub-county records 
whether PSPs have delivered on contractual obligations under NAADS, but is difficult to 
know from the records whether the farmers were satisfied with the quality of extension 
services. It is even quiet next to impossible that interviewing PSPs will reveal their short 
comings. Under such circumstances, evaluating the impact of NAADS requires a survey 
of the program beneficiaries to elicit information about access to advisory services on 
agricultural outcomes. The next section lays out the methodology we used to accomplish 
such a task. 
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CHAPTER THREE. METHODOLOGY 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The goal of this chapter is to discuss the survey methodologies that were applied 
between September 2005-April 2006 in Uganda to elicit information on farmers’ 
participation in the NAADS program, quality evaluations of PSP services and the impact 
of access to advisory services among participating farmers. Our methodology involved a 
triangulation of qualitative and quantitative methods with a view that the former 
complement the latter (Ravallion, 2003). First, we discuss the survey design and 
instrument, and then describe the site and sample selection. Sub-section 3.4 describes the 
units of analysis and measurement. Sub-section 3.5 briefly discusses the qualitative and 
quantitative methods applied including the type of questions we address. Sub-section 3.6 
concludes with a discussion of the survey and the estimation challenges. 
 
The survey design and instrument 
 
Our goal is understand the impact of access to NAADS on the value of farm 
production per acre. The factors that affect the crop yield include innate unobservable 
farmer abilities (managerial and non-managerial), the agro-ecological conditions of the 
land (soil quality and weather), the inputs used in production (e.g., labor, capital [social, 
physical and human], land, time, fertilizers), location-specific factors, policy (e.g., 
availability of NAADS services in a particular sub-county), and the availability of 
infrastructure (markets, roads). 
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Other factors include the institutional environment in which farmers operate (e.g., 
land tenure system, insurance, opportunities, and laws), and risk and uncertainty faced by 
farmers (e.g., price variations, weather variability, crop diseases and pests) (Reardon & 
Glewwe, 2000b). 
To address the research question, survey data are combined with administrative 
data. The survey is based on a revised LSMS module on agriculture (Reardon & Glewwe, 
2000b). This module was complemented with additional questions drawn from the 
Uganda Bureau of Statistics (UBOS)’s Socio-Economic Survey (UNHS), and questions 
that we designed to address specific issues with respect to the NAADS program (see 
Table A1). The novelty of the LSMS is not only the depth with which one can understand 
factors affecting a particular outcome of interest (in our case crop yields) but also the 
potential flexibility with which one can apply them to address policy relevant questions.19 
However, adopting any module from the LSMS calls for greater resources in terms of 
time, expertise, organizational capacity and funding. Sub-section 3.6 discusses the 
fieldwork challenges. 
The sections adopted from the agriculture module of the LSMS include the land 
owned, rented-in or rented-out, farm equipment, labor (household member and hired) and 
non-labor inputs, crop output, livestock and advisory services. We adopted the crop codes 
used in the UBOS’s 1999 UNHS crop survey module (see Table A2). The questions 
modified from the UNHS include those on household background characteristics 
including health, education, sex, and age controls, housing conditions, assets and access 
to and sources of credit. 
                                                 
19 A detailed account of the LSMS is contained in (Grosh & Glewwe, 1995, 2000). 
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The questions that we added to reflect our objective included farmer perceptions 
of local governance, participation and knowledge of local village voting processes, 
political connectivity, social networks, and awareness of the NAADS program. 
To capture inter-farmer communications, the social network variables used 
included the number of days in a month a farmer interacts with fellow farmers, the 
number of days a farmer allocates to learning at the sub-county and the number of days a 
farmer allocates to social gathering functions. We define social gathering functions to 
include off-farm activities that bring farmers together for any reason. These were 
classified as functions such as entertainment, funeral ceremonies, religious functions, 
drinking (alcohol), and “nigina.”20 
Other questions included relate to the demand for advisory services, methods of 
advisory services, access to infrastructure, record keeping, perception on the quality of 
services provided by PSPs, farmers’ source of price information for agricultural produce, 
willingness to purchase advisory services and co-financing of the NAADS program. 
The administrative data include data on performance indicators for local 
governments, private service contracts, and agro-climatic data such as weather data. The 
qualitative methods applied included focus group discussions (FGDs) within each of the 
treatment sub-counties. The FGDs discussed issues of quality of services delivered by the 
PSPs, farmer institutional development, information flow between farmer leaders and the 
sub-county officials, monitoring of the program, and co-financing of the NAADS 
program. The FGDs were complemented with key informant interviews (such as the 
                                                 
20 “Nigina” is a local “Luganda” language term that literally means “walk like the rich.” Nigina 
Associations are social capital associations where people join efforts to help one another by giving money 
and household assets to group members in a rotation fashion. This form of social capital is increasingly 
becoming popular in Uganda; mostly in rural areas but also common in city suburbs. 
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farmers’ representatives, sub-county NAADS coordinators, and community development 
officers). 
The survey was implemented in stages. The first step involved consultations with 
the NAADS secretariat and technical personnel on survey implementation at UBOS and 
EPRC. It was followed by field pre-testing of the survey instrument and the training of 
field enumerators. The pre-test helped in modifying the questionnaire to suite local 
environment.21 During the pre-testing stage we found that it takes about 3 hours to fill a 
questionnaire. This time is too long to maintain a conversation with a farmer who must 
take care of other farm or household activities. Although, we had scheduled appointments 
with local authorities and farmers before the survey, our experience revealed that the 
process was very demanding of the farmers. The consolation we had was that farmers 
were always very eager to be interviewed; although certainly when it comes to 
information on household assets, land and livestock, some feel uncomfortable. Always 
the assurance was that the data is not for government (especially tax) purposes but for 
purely academic purposes. We kept promising and reaffirming confidentiality all the 
time. 
Given the variations in local languages spoken across our study sites, it was 
important that we recruit field assistants who have excellent command of the local 
languages, but also fluent in English. The process of recruitment was coordinated in close 
collaboration with the district planning officers, who then mobilized potential field 
assistants. The preferred candidates were those who have had previous experience with 
                                                 
21 However, actual implementation was faced with a challenge on the disposition (post harvests) section of 
the module. Generally, farmers could hardly recall information on how much they consumed, stored or lost 
to animals. This section was thus dropped from the questionnaire to reduce on the time it takes to answer 
the questionnaire.   
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data collection, particularly with UBOS. Although the targeted candidates group was 
advanced level graduates, luck brought us university graduates and students. Training 
was conducted at the district headquarters. For each of the study sites a post survey was 
carried out to fill some of the gaps on questions which arose during the first round. 
The data was captured using a database designed using Microsoft Access. The 
database was ready at the time of data collection; otherwise it would have been difficult 
to keep up with the data processing given the limited time. 
 
The site selection and sample size 
 
During the first year of implementation, six districts were selected for piloting the 
NAADS program. The selection was not random, as it took into account factors such as 
the rankings of a district in the local government performance indicators and the 
agricultural potential. The NAADS pilot districts at inception were Arua, Kabale, 
Kibaale, Mukono, Soroti, and Tororo (Map 1).22 Within each of the initial districts, 4 sub-
counties were selected to pilot the program. By December 2005, the NAADS program 
had extended to 37 districts covering a total of 334 sub-counties across Uganda (Republic 
of Uganda, 2005c). 
The present study is based on a random selection out of the pilot NAADS 
districts. The reason for this choice is based on the fact that to understand the impacts of 
the NAADS program, one needs to study NAADS processes in those districts that have 
had the program much longer than the “newer” districts into the NAADS. The three 
                                                 
22 If selection of these regions was based on them being good performers, then an upward bias might arise 
if we neglect the non-random program placement in our modeling (Morduch, 1998). 
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districts selected for this study were Kabale, Mukono and Tororo. These districts are 
hereafter referred to as NAADS (treatment) districts. 
Within each of the treatment districts, one sub-county was selected out of the 
original 4 sub-counties. However, it is important to note that since its inception, the 
NAADS program has rolled out to other sub-counties within the treatment districts and 
that some sub-counties have not joined the NAADS program (Table 2). 
 
Table 2. Number of sub-counties in each of the study districts 
 Selected Districts 
 NAADS Districts Non-NAADS 
District 
 Mukono Kabale Tororo Kayunga 
Year of entry # joined NAADS 
2001/2002 4 4 3* 
2002/2003 5 5 2 
2003/2004 2 3 1 
2004/2005 11  3 
2005/2006 2   
Total no. of NAADS 
sub-counties (SCs) 
Total 24 12 9 
Total no. of SCs in district 28*** 18 18 9 
Total no. of Non-NAADS SCs 
closer** to selected NAADS SCs 
1 1 2 
Total no. of NAADS SCs surveyed 1 1 1 
 
Total no. of non-NAADS SCs 
surveyed 
1 1 1 1 
Total no. of SCs surveyed in district. 2 2 2 1 
Source: Author 
* Although four sub-counties started with the program, Nagongera sub-county was scrapped from the program 
following mismanagement of the program in that sub-county. 
** Ideally we considered those sub-counties that border with the selected NAADS sub-counties. However, for the case 
of Kisoko sub-county in Tororo district, the closest (bordering) non-NAADS sub-county was Nagongera, which was 
scrapped from the NAADS program. Since this sub-county could not qualify for selection in this study, Paya sub-
county was selected as closer to Kisoko sub-county 
***figure includes 4 urban municipalities. 
 
The analogy applied in the selection of the treatment districts is the same applied 
in the selection of the treatment sub-counties. The selected sub-counties are hereafter 
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referred to as NAADS (treatment) sub-counties. These sub-counties were Kyanamira in 
Kabale district, Kasawo in Mukono district and Kisoko in Tororo district. Since within 
each selected treatment district some sub-counties do not participate in the NAADS 
program (see Figure 1), it is important to include a sample of them in the study. We refer 
to the selected sub-counties as Non-NAADS (control) sub-counties within the treatment 
district. The choice of these sub-counties was based on being in a similar geographical 
region with the selected treatment sub-county (The cultural backgrounds of farmers 
staying in two neighboring sub-counties [a treatment and a control] are likely to be 
similar). The selected non-NAADS sub-counties were Kaharo sub-county in Kabale 
district, Ntunda sub-county in Mukono district, and Paya in Tororo sub-county.23 
Therefore within each treatment district, one NAADS and one non-NAADS sub-county 
was selected. 
Because the NAADS program had not yet rolled out to the rest of the country at 
the time of our study, we sample one district that had not joined the NAADS program. 
This district is referred to as a non-NAADS district or control district. The ideal case 
would have been selecting one control district in a geographical region close to each of 
the selected treatment district. However, due to budgetary and time limitations, it was not 
possible to execute the study in three control districts. Instead one control district of 
Kayunga, closer to Mukono district (selected treatment district) was selected. The 
Weakness of this decision is that Kayunga may serve as a better control for Mukono and 
                                                 
23 At the time our interviews were conducted, Ntunda sub-county was still a non-NAADS sub-county 
within Mukono district. However, the sub-county has recently joined the NAADS program. Furthermore, 
the evaluation problem becomes complicated when the so called ‘control’ has other programs going on. An 
example is Kaharo sub County, which although not under NAADS, runs a similar program known as Area 
based Agricultural Modernization Program (AAMP). The presence of such ‘parallel’ programs causes 
evaluation as well as coordination problems. Harmonization of such programs with the NAADS program is 
very important. 
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not Kabale and Tororo. Within Kayunga district, one sub-county was selected as a non-
NAADS sub-county in a Non-NAADS district.  The chosen sub-county was Kangulumira 
sub-county. 
 
Selection of the farmers 
 
The farmers interviewed throughout the study were not drawn from a single 
village but instead spread across four villages, one in each of the four selected parishes 
within the sampled sub-counties. 
The interviews were conducted at the household level. Every household selected 
in this study represents a farmer.24 A household is defined as a NAADS farmer if any 
member of the household (usually husband or wife or both) is a registered member to one 
or more NAADS farmers’ groups. A household is defined as a non-NAADS farmer if no 
member of the household has ever belonged to the NAADS farmers’ groups. The selected 
farmers’ residences were located with the help of community development officers, 
NAADS sub-county coordinators, and chairpersons of the NAADS farmers’ fora at the 
sub-county. 
Using the NAADS farmers’ group listings in each treatment sub-county as our 
sampling frame, 47 farmers from Kasawo sub-county, 40 farmers from Kisoko sub-
county, and 40 farmers from Kyanamira sub-county were randomly drawn (Table 2). 
These farmers are referred to as NAADS (treated) farmers. 
It is worth pointing out that within each treatment sub-county, some farmers 
participate in the NAADS program and others do not (see Figure 1). Every farmer is 
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eligible to join the NAADS program, but ideally those with some assets (e.g., land) and 
the economically active farmers are likely to participate. Since some farmers self-select 
to join the NAADS program and others do not, it is important to sample some farmers 
who do not participate in the NAADS program. We refer to these farmers as Non-NAADS 
(control) farmers. In total 25 farmers from Kasawo sub-county, 25 farmers from Kisoko 
sub-county, and 22 farmers from Kyanamira sub-county were interviewed. 
Within each non-NAADS sub-county in a treated district, 20 farmers were 
randomly selected from a sub-county population listing. Therefore, a total of 60 farmers 
were interviewed. These farmers constitute another control group from non-NAADS sub-
counties within the treatment district. Lastly from the control district, a random sample of 
50 farmers was selected from 4 parishes. These farmers constitute the third control group. 
                                                                                                                                                 
24 We interchangeably use the term household to mean a selected farmer. 
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Table 3. Classification of households in study sub-counties 
 Selected sub-counties from NAADS districts Selected sub-
county from a 
non NAADS 
district. 
 NAADS sub-counties Non-NAADS sub-counties  
 Kasawo Kisoko Kyanamira Ntunda Paya Kaharo Kangulumira 
Total 
population* 
31,149 15,062 19,328 13,412 30,912 17,974 43,703 
Total no. of 
households* 
 
6,683 2,927 3,976 3,025 6,549 3,635 9,453 
No. of 
NAADS 
households*
* 
1764 1044 1,268 
Total no. of 
non-
NAADS 
households*
** 
4919 1,883 2,708 3,025 6,549 3,635 9,453 
 Treatment group (TF) 
NAADS 
households 
sampled 
47 40 40 
Control group 1 Control Group 2 control group 
3 
Non-
NAADS 
farmers 
sampled 
25 25 22 20 20 20 50 
Source: Author 
* Obtained from Uganda Bureau of Statistics, 2002 Census Report. 
** Obtained from NAADS Secretariat based farmers’ group information of fully registered NAADS households. 
*** Computed by author as the difference between total number of households and total number of NAADS 
households in a NAADS sub-county. 
 
An important point to note is that non-NAADS farmers outside the treatment sub-
counties include farmers who probably would have participated in the NAADS if the 
program had been available to them. 
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The units of analysis and measurement 
 
Reardon & Glewwe (2000b) note that in hard-to-survey situations, Uganda a case 
in point, farmers grow a variety of crops and rear a variety of animals typically on 
smallholder farms. The use of non-standard (local) units of measurement is common and 
only few of the daily transactions might involve cash. Farmers might have several small 
plots dispersed and sometimes controlled by different managers. Plots differ in terms of 
proximity to the farmer’s dwelling, land quality and use, degree of land degradation and 
erosion and other characteristics. 
Furthermore, there might be few or no literate adults in the household (Reardon & 
Glewwe, 2000b). These features are typical of Uganda’s rural farmers. Given this setting, 
it is recommended that disaggregated data at a plot rather than the entire farm level and 
by season rather than by calendar year be collected to minimize the chances that the data 
will suffer from serious measurement error (Reardon & Glewwe, 2000b).25 In addition, 
collection of data on a seasonal basis accounts for possibility that some farmers exhibit 
variations in access to extension, credit, and crop mix. 
The number of agricultural seasons in a particular region and the exact timing of 
the survey are other issues that need to be considered (Reardon & Glewwe, 2000b). The 
recall period for recording agricultural output and inputs should be the cropping season, 
not the preceding 12 months, particularly for countries with two or more seasons per year 
(Reardon & Glewwe, 2000b). In Uganda, there are two agricultural seasons, since there 
are two rainy seasons per year. The first cropping season runs from April to August and 
                                                 
25 There is an exception with respect to livestock. Questions related to livestock should be asked at the 
household level (Reardon & Glewwe, 2000b). 
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the second from November to January. The best timing for the interview is after the end 
of the cropping season. The survey commenced in September 2005 and ended in April 
2006. 
The person managing a particular plot is perhaps a better person to interview 
(Reardon & Glewwe, 2000b). This is because we are able to elicit the relevant 
information from the most knowledgeable person. We interviewed the plot managers 
(household heads or spouses or both). 
To address the problem of non-standardized units of measurement, we collected 
data in its non-standardized form and applied unit conversions used by the UBOS in 
household surveys (Table A2). In addition, for specific crops such as water melons, 
cabbages, pineapples, and paw paws, we took weights for the smallest, medium and large 
sizes in selected markets in each of the study sites (see footnote Table A2). Failure to 
account for differences in weights of such crops may result in incorrect measurements of 
crop yields. 
 
Qualitative and quantitative methods 
 
The qualitative approaches applied in this study included document reviews, 
semi-structured interviews with farmers’, focus group discussions, and direct 
observations (Chung, 2000). The purpose of the qualitative evaluations is to complement 
the quantitative analysis. It is argued that qualitative approaches can aid in explaining 
certain processes that we “may” fail to capture in modeling (Kanbur, 2003). However, by 
no means do such methods imply causation (Rao & Woolcook, 2003). The qualitative 
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methods were used to answer the following general questions: Are PSPs providing the 
services as stipulated in the contracts? How effective are different sub-county level 
players in monitoring NAADS activities? How effective are farmer groups in managing 
technology demonstration sites? Do the farmers and sub-counties co-finance their 
counterpart NAADS funds? 
The quantitative analysis contains both the descriptive analysis and the causal 
(only the reduced form) analysis. The former is used to answer questions such as what 
crops (animals) do NAADS and non-NAADS farmers grow (keep)? Which households 
are using technologies under TDS? What agricultural inputs such as fertilizers, pesticides 
and farm equipment are used by NAADS and non-NAADS farmers? What households 
access credit and what are the sources of the credit? How effective are sub-counties 
perceived by NAADS and non-NAADS farmers? Are there variations among farmers 
(NAADS versus non-NAADS) in the participation of local political elections? Are there 
variations in the crop yields across NAADS and non-NAADS farmers? 
Although the estimates from the descriptive analysis are approximations, they do 
not account for the behavior of agricultural households (Reardon & Glewwe, 2000b). For 
this reason we explore the causal analysis to answer the question of impact of access to 
advisory services on the value of farm production per acre. 
 
Survey and estimation challenges 
 
In the above sub-section we raised concern over the possibility of response bias. 
Households were reluctant to provide data on household assets, land and livestock. In 
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addition, missing data points were another problem, despite the training efforts to 
minimize the problem. Measurement errors are another possibility. Farmers faced recall 
problems in having to remember how much they harvested; although after explanations 
using local units of measurement some revealed more information than others. 
The estimation problems we confront include both the non-random program 
placement and the self-selection in/out of the NAADS programs (see Chapter 1). In 
addition to these endogeneity problems, there is the problem of having to deal with 
clustered samples (Deaton, 1997; Wooldridge, 2002). Farmers staying in a particular 
village are likely to be more similar on a variety of ways. In order to correctly analyze the 
data, the correlations need to be taken into account. Failure to do so may result in 
underestimation of the standard errors. The problem is that the higher the intra cluster 
correlation, the less unique information each additional household member provides. 
Lastly, the failure to adjust for the sampling design would yield incorrect variance 
estimates (Stata Guide, 2005). 
We address the non-random program placement and self-selection by applying the 
IV methods. First, we exploit political and geographical variables to explain participation 
into the NAADS program. The political variables include the political connectivity of the 
farmer to the sub-county leadership, whether or not the farmer is satisfied with sub-
county in managing their activities and in mobilizing them to work together. We also ask 
about the farmer’s awareness of local political voting processes and whether the farmer 
participated in the most recent local elections at the sub-county. The presumption is that 
these variables do not affect the agricultural outcome of interest. We test for whether the 
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IVs are good instruments.26 In addition, other factors such as the local government 
assessment indicators are potential candidates for IVs considered in the placement 
decisions. However, we face the problem that some factors that affect the placement 
decision are correlated with the outcome of interest. For example, the agro-potential of 
the sub-county is a candidate in choosing whether a particular sub-county joins NAADS 
or not. 
We adjust the variance estimations by computing probability weights using the 
procedure and data in Table A3. We also apply the clustered robust standard errors option 
in STATA to correct for the intra-cluster correlation. Our problem, however, is that 
computation of intra-cluster correlations requires a fair number of clusters, which we do 
not have. 
Based on the review in Chapter two, and assuming we have controlled for the 
potential confounding problems, we would expect access to decentralized advisory 
services under NAADS to result in higher crop yields among NAADS farmers than non-
NAADS farmers. The next chapter checks the validity of this hypothesis by presenting 
the empirical results. 
 
                                                 
26 Really ‘‘good’’ instruments are not easy to come by (Deaton, 1997; Wooldridge, 2002). 
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CHAPTER FOUR. EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
Introduction 
 
The goal of this chapter is to present the empirical findings on the impact of 
access to advisory services under the NAADS program. The chapter constitutes two main 
sub-sections. The first sub-section provides the quantitative analysis and the second 
provides the qualitative analysis. The qualitative findings are summarized in the form of 
responses to the questions raised in sub-section 3.5. The quantitative section applies the 
IV methods to estimate the impact of the NAADS program among participating farmers. 
The review of the literature on agricultural extension in developing countries 
revealed mixed impacts of the Training and Visit (T and V) extension system on 
agricultural outcomes (Birkhaeuser et al, 1991). One of the outstanding challenges in the 
literature relates to the measurement and attribution of program impacts in face of 
econometric challenges such as self-selection in programs and non-random program 
placements. However, more recently, econometric procedures that seek to correct for 
such challenges have emerged; these include the application of the IV methods.27 The 
next subsection describes and applies the IV method using farm level data collected from 
selected districts in Uganda. 
The focus of this study is to analyze the program impact of the recent 
decentralized agricultural extension program, known as the NAADS, which started in 
2001 in selected districts in Uganda. In the previous chapter, we discussed that the 
NAADS program focuses on farmer empowerment to demand and hold accountable 
service providers of agricultural extension services. In other words, the farmers, as clients 
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decide the type of agricultural and marketing knowledge that they need, and are also able 
to contract with PSPs selected from a pool on a competitive basis. The selection of the 
PSPs is based on guidelines laid out and developed by the central government and local 
authorities; with the later heavily involved in coordinating the delivery of agricultural 
extension services. 
The NAADS program targets the economically-active poor, defined to include 
those with limited physical and financial assets (especially land), skills and knowledge. 
The very poor and the large-scale farmers are eligible to participate in the program 
although they are not the targeted population. However, unlike other targeted programs 
for which “strict” eligibility rules are supposed to apply, the NAADS program does not 
exclude participation within a participating sub-county.28 Women and youth are 
encouraged to participate, although in practice it has not been easy to get youth to 
participate in the NAADS program. Our discussions with farmers in the farmers’ groups 
pointed to the fact that the youth prefer off-farm enterprises (such as becoming boda 
boda cyclists) or migration to towns where they end up doing low-skill jobs.29 Women, 
on the other hand, are eager to participate in NAADS; although there are still cultural 
                                                                                                                                                 
27 Blundell & Dias (2000) provide an overview of the evaluation methods for non-experimental data. 
28 An example of targeted programs applying eligibility rules are the three credit programs in Bangladesh 
discussed in (Morduch, 1998). The eligibility rule, although doubtedly adhered to requires that access to 
credit is limited to participants having less than half an acre of land. The absence of a clear eligibility rule 
under NAADS has implications for our analysis. For example, one could be poor with no assets such as 
land, but he/she rents-in land and then chooses to participate in NAADS. Similarly, a rich person may 
choose to participate, although the program seeks out to the economically active poor. There are certain 
unobservable characteristics that may compel one to belong to the program. Probably we can think of the 
economically active poor as those farmers who are “eager” to improve their welfare by exert higher effort 
(which is unobservable to the researcher) and at the same time they own or have access to some assets (e.g., 
land). 
29 Boda Bodas are motor cycles used for business to transport people, goods and services. Earlier users of 
the boda boda used bicycles. More recently, with the support of micro finance institutions, some old 
participants and new entrants in the Boda Bodas business have accessed loans to buy motor cycles. In other 
cases the youth work for the owner of a boda boda for a negotiable wage, usually on a daily basis. This 
form of transport is popular in all parts of Uganda today. 
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impediments that hinder women’s participation in NAADS. This was particularly the 
case in Kasawo and Kisoko sub-counties. Women are expected to perform farm as well 
as household cores and in some cases refused by their husbands to participate in 
community participation activities including NAADS. 
That said, a key characteristic of NAADS, an example of a recent anti-poverty 
program, is that some regions and therefore some households get the program and others 
do not.30 The non-random placement of the program casts doubt on the exogeneity of 
assignment to NAADS and hence one must appeal to evaluation methods that might help 
isolate the variation in program placement that is exogenous. The IV method is adequate 
if we can find IVs that do not change outcomes conditional on participation and other 
covariates but do influence participation. 
The literature shows that analysts of agricultural extension impacts are 
increasingly relying on non-random evaluation methods to address these econometric 
challenges. For example, Feder et al.(2004a) and Godtland et al.( 2004) study the impacts 
of the Farmer Field Schools (FFS) approach. Feder et al. (2004a)) applied difference in 
differences (DD) methods to study the impact of FFS graduates on farm yields and 
pesticide use in Indonesia. They utilized a panel household survey dataset that covered 
both FFS farmers and non-FFS farmers. Their empirical results do not indicate that the 
FFS induced significant improvements in yields or reduction in pesticide use by 
graduates relative to other farmers. In addition, secondary diffusion effects on those 
exposed to graduates are also not significant. 
Godtland et al. (2004) applied Propensity Score Matching (PSM) methods to 
study the impact of the FFS on farmers’ knowledge among participating potato farmers in 
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Peru. This method is invoked so as to ensure that the bias in the impact estimate due to 
selection on observables is minimized. Similar to the NAADS program, selection of FFS 
villages was not random. An International NGO, CARE-Peru, had been running another 
rural development project called Andino. Selection of FFS participating villages was 
from the pool of villages participating in Andino. In addition, villages closer to the 
district capital were selected for participation. The FFS targeted the middle income 
population. All farmers in a selected village were eligible to participate in the program, 
but with the requirement that participants had to attend all the training sessions. Pre-
existing farmers’ groups took advantage of the call and enlisted first into FFS. They find 
that farmers who participated in the program have significantly more knowledge about 
Integrated Pest Management (IPM) practices than the non-participants. However, the 
authors note that if control over land and household assets proxies for wealth, it suggests 
that FFS is better taken advantage of by the wealthier, while traditional transfer-of-
technology approaches cater to less endowed farmers. The FFS extension method is thus 
better fit for younger farmers and for farmers with greater endowments. 
With regard to the NAADS program, few studies have been carried out to analyze 
its impacts on the program beneficiaries. These include Scangari study (Republic of 
Uganda, 2005c) and a study by the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) 
in collaboration with the NAADS secretariat (hereafter, NAADS/IFPRI) in 2005. Both 
studies found that farmers are accessing advisory services much more than they used to 
during the old extension system. However, despite the positive effects of NAADS on 
adoption of improved production technologies and practices, the NAADS/IFPRI study 
did not find significant differences in yield growth between NAADS and non-NAADS 
                                                                                                                                                 
30 (Ravallion, 2006) provides a comprehensive discussion on the evaluation of such anti-poverty programs. 
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sub-counties for most crops. In addition, the NAADS/IFPRI study did not find evidence 
of strong impacts of NAADS on farmers’ sense of empowerment. However, the Scangari 
study did find strong evidence of farmer empowerment. 
The Scangari study was purely based on qualitative survey approaches and 
document reviews. The NAADS/IFPRI study is perhaps the first attempt in quantifying 
the impacts of the NAADS program. Although the NAADS/IFPRI study conducted 
comparative statistics between participating and non-participating farmers, it did not 
control for the non-random program placement as well as the self-selection of farmers 
into the NAADS program. 
The objective of this study is to estimate the impact of access to the NAADS 
program by applying the IV techniques to take into account the econometric challenges 
discussed above. The goal is to account for the potential sources of bias in measuring 
program impacts. Three sources of biases can emerge in the NAADS program (see 
Godtland et al, 2005 for a similar analogy). NAADS participants are likely to differ from 
non-participants in the distribution of their observed characteristics, leading to a bias 
from selection on observables. Such a bias is likely to arise because of the criteria used 
for selecting NAADS sub-counties. Such criteria included local government assessment 
indicators, which are not expected to have an impact on agricultural outcomes. The 
second problem is that of potential diffusion of knowledge in NAADS sub-counties. In 
the presence of such biases, comparison of NAADS and non-NAADS farmers in the 
same sub-county is likely to underestimate the program impact. Third, NAADS 
farmers/participants may differ from non-participants in the distribution of unobserved 
characteristics such as the farming ability that affects both the decision to participate in 
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NAADS and the outcomes of interest such as yields, resulting in a bias due to selection 
on unobservables. 
 
The analytical framework 
 
This section lays out the estimation approach based on the IV methods. Let y 
denote our measure of agricultural productivity. The dependent variable y can take two 
values for each farmer: y1 denotes the value of y when treatment is received (belonging to 
the NAADS) and yo denotes the value of y without treatment. The impact evaluation 
problem that we face is one of missing data, in the sense that for any given farmer, we 
only observe y1 or yo but not both at any given point in time (Wooldridge, 2002). Let tof 
denote a dummy variable indicating treatment. If tof =1, then y = y1 and if tof = 0, then y 
= y0. The objective is to estimate the benefit of belonging to the NAADS that is to 
estimate: y1- y0, the variation in gains from the NAADS. 
The testable hypothesis is that farmers participating in NAADS get access to 
better advisory services provided by the PSPs and thus are likely to access and adopt 
better agricultural knowledge and skills, which in turn will lead to better agricultural 
outcomes. The agricultural outcome of interest is the value of farm production per acre 
defined as the total of the value of crop production and value of livestock adjusted by the 
total farm land used for farming. Price data to compute the values of crop production was 
collected from three neighboring markets in each of the study sites. The instrument used 
to collect this data is attached in Table A1. The details of how the prices were computed 
are provided in Table A4). 
  
69
 
Data on output were collected using the farmers’ questionnaire. In the survey we 
asked the farmer to identify which crops had been grown and harvested in each of the two 
agricultural seasons outlined in Chapter 3. Using the conversion factors in Table A2, crop 
yield was computed as the product of the amount harvested and the corresponding 
conversions of the non-standard units in kilograms. The derived output was multiplied by 
the price per kilogram to derive the value of crop production for each crop harvested by 
the farmer. By aggregating over the value of crop production on each plot by season, we 
derived the value of total crop production. The survey also asked questions on the 
number of animals reared and the farmer’s own valuation of the value of each animal if a 
price to purchase that animal was offered. The data from these questions is used to 
compute the value of animals, which is a capital stock. We assume 10 percent of this 
capital stock as the value of the income flow from rearing the animals. The sum of the 
value of crop production and value of the income flow are adjusted by the total farm land 
used for farming to derive the value of farm production per acre. 
Using the value of the farm production per acre as the dependent variable in 
analyzing the NAADS impact is better than focusing on either the value of crop 
agricultural production alone or the value of animals reared. The NAADS program is 
promoting both crop farming and animal rearing but with focus on value addition 
through, among others, the procurement of high breed seed and animal varieties and to 
some extent “off-farm” enterprises (e.g., fish farming). The value of the farm production 
per acre measure takes into account the notion that households diversify their farm 
activities to reduce their risk exposure. This study does not, however, analyze the impact 
of NAADS on other agricultural outcomes that the NAADS program is expected to 
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affect. These include the impact on non-farm enterprises such as fish farming and bee 
keeping. Such activities are still on a small scale in rural areas of Uganda. 
We apply the IV method to account for the non-random NAADS program 
placement and self-selection in/out of NAADS. The presumption is that the IVs affect 
participation but not the outcome equation. The IVs used in identifying the outcome 
equation are the local government assessment indicators that were in part used in 
deciding whether a particular sub-county or district participates in the NAADS program 
or not.31 
Since 2000, the Ministry of Local Government has institutionalized the annual 
assessment of minimum conditions and performance measures for all local governments 
irrespective of the donors supporting them. Before then, the assessment was conducted 
under the first district development performance in 31 districts and 13 municipalities. 
The 2001 assessment comprised measures to verify local government compliance 
to the provisions of the laws and regulations to assist local governments to identify 
functional capacity gaps which if addressed would lead to increased outputs and 
ultimately improved service delivery and poverty reduction and to reward good 
performance and sanction poor local government performance as a strategy for 
institutional strengthening. The parameters used include the quality of development plan 
(qdp), monitoring and evaluation (ME) mentoring, communication and accountability 
(CA); and local revenue performance (LRP). Overall, the assessments of local 
governments are aimed at deepening the decentralization policy in general. 
                                                 
31 The assessment of local governments is conducted each year and seeks to establish the degree of local 
governments’ conformity to stipulated laws and regulations as provided for in the Local Government Act 
1997, Local Government Financial and Accounting Regulations 1998 and the Local Governments Tender 
Board Rules and Regulations. 
  
71
 
For each of the parameters considered, a local government is assessed on 
performance as follows: (i) the local government scoring at least 7 of 10 points in the 
assessment qualifies for that parameter; (ii) local government scoring 5 or 6 points out of 
10 are considered “static” for that parameter; (iii) local governments scoring less than 5 
out of 10 are considered for a penalty for that parameter. A local government forfeits its 
status for a bonus or static under performance measures if it did not meet the minimum 
conditions. 
Table 4 below presents the scores on selected parameters for each of the sub-
counties included in our sample. The performance measures are based on the 2003 local 
government assessment report. The report contains assessment for the year 2002. The 
assessments reflect factors that the authorities might have taken into account in rolling 
out the NAADS program implementation in 2002. 
 
Table 4. Local government assessment indicator scores of sampled sub-counties 
 Mukono Kabale Tororo Kayunga 
 NAADS Non-
NAADS 
NAADS Non-
NAADS 
NAADS Non-
NAADS 
Non-NAADS 
district 
Performance measure Kasawo Ntunda Kyanamira Kaharo Kisoko Paya Kangulumira 
Quality of development plan 7 10 10 8 8 6 8 
Monitoring and Evaluation 
mentoring 
8 10 9 9 7 7 9 
Communication and 
Accountability 
9 10 8 7 3 4 5 
Local Revenue Performance 7 5 8 8 4 2 5 
Source: Ministry of Local Government, 2003. 
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The empirical specification 
 
We assume that the value of the farm production per acre by a farmer is 
influenced by factors such as the vector of shares of area planted to different types of 
crops, land management practices, household’s endowment of physical capital, human 
capital and social capital, hired labor, agro-ecological conditions, and access to markets 
and infrastructure. 
Certain crops flourish in specific agroecological conditions. We would expect that 
the value of crop production and thus, the value of the farm production per acre would be 
positively affected by better agroecological conditions. As noted by Nkonya et al.(2004) 
and Pender & Gebremedhin (2006) perennial crops such as coffee and bananas generally 
grow better in bimodal, higher rainfall areas, such as the high potential bimodal zones, 
than in the drier, unimodal zones. Perennial crops are likely to be found in the more 
humid bimodal rainfall zones. In areas of generally higher agricultural potential, such as 
in highland areas having favorable rainfall and fertile volcanic soils, we would expect the 
higher value commodities such as horticulture crops (including fruits, vegetables). 
Lower-value commodities, such as cereals, are more likely to be grown in areas of lower 
potential, along with complementary livestock production (McIntire, Bourzat, & Pingali, 
1992). 
Given the substantial transaction costs of storing, transporting, and marketing 
commodities, access to markets and roads is critical for determining the comparative 
advantage of a location, given its agricultural potential (Pender & Gebremedhin, 2006). 
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Better access to markets and roads is expected to increase the use of purchased inputs and 
the capital intensity of agriculture by increasing the profitability and availability of such 
inputs and increasing access to credit (Binswanger & McIntire, 1987). However, as 
pointed out by Pender & Gebremedhin (2006), the impacts of markets and roads access 
are ambiguous. To the extent that better access promotes production of higher-value 
crops, increases the local prices of crops, and promotes more intensive use of inputs, it 
tends to increase the value of crop production and thus the value of the farm. However, 
better access may also reduce the labor intensity of crop production and thus could reduce 
the value of the output. 
Access to credit programs may enable farmers to purchase inputs or acquire 
physical capital, thus contributing to technology adoption and increased capital and input 
intensity in agriculture (Feder, Just, & Zilberman, 1985). This may promote increased 
production and marketing of high-value crops or intensification of livestock production 
and permit reduction of subsistence production. If credit availability helps relax credit 
constraints, this can reduce the extent to which households discount the future. Credit 
may also facilitate labor hiring and thus promote labor intensification. However, credit 
availability may enable households to invest in nonfarm activities, and thus may 
contribute to less intensive management of land and other agricultural resources. The net 
impact of credit on crop production is thus ambiguous. 
Education is likely to increase households’ opportunities for salaried employment 
off farm, and may increase their ability to start up various nonfarm activities (Barrett, 
Reardon, & Webb, 2001; Deininger & Okidi, 2001). Education may increase access to 
credit, as well as cash income, thus helping to finance purchases of physical capital and 
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purchased inputs. This may help to promote high-value crop and intensive livestock 
production, as well as promoting greater use of such capital and inputs in producing 
traditional food crops. Education may also facilitate changes to income strategies and 
technologies, by increasing access to information about alternative market opportunities 
and technologies (Feder et al., 1985). However, more educated households may be less 
likely to invest in inputs or labor intensive land investments and management practices, 
because the opportunity costs of their labor and capital may be increased by education. 
As a result, the net impact of education on crop production is ambiguous. 
If factor markets (markets for land, labor, and capital) do not function efficiently, 
then there may be significant differences among households in their land management 
practices and agricultural productivity (de Janvry, Fafchamps, & Sadoulet, 1991). In the 
context of imperfect labor and land markets, agricultural households with less land or a 
larger family labor endowment per unit of land can be expected to use land more 
intensively in agricultural production. The impact of smaller farm size or large family 
size on the value of crop production per hectare is likely to be positive if labor and land 
markets are imperfect, or zero, if these markets function well. 
Similar to the methodology by Pender & Gebremedhin (2006), we model the 
value of farm production per acre to depend on the choice of crops and the farm-level 
prices of these crops, the inputs and land management practices used in producing them 
and the natural conditions of the plot. Because  the choice of crops planted varies among 
households and regions in Uganda, we do not explicitly include crop prices as 
determinants of the value of crop production, instead, we assume that farm-level prices 
are determined by village-level factors determining local supply including agro-
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ecological factors, demand,  and transportation costs of commodities and household-level 
factors affecting transaction costs an marketing abilities. 
However, instead of running a structural equation, we run estimates of a semi-
reduced form of the value of the farm production per acre. The causal factors considered 
include agroecological zones, access to markets and roads, farm size, access to credit, a 
dummy variable capturing participation in NAADS, physical assets, such as equipment 
and livestock. Farm size is measured as the logarithm of acres of total farm land owned 
under cultivation. Household and social attributes include family size, education, age, 
health status, and sex of the farmer. 
The model specification is given by (1): 
iiiii ZXIPy μαααα +′+′++= 3210        [1] 
where Yi is the value of farm production per acre, IPi denotes participation in 
NAADS, Xi denotes household characteristics, and Zi denotes geographical 
characteristics such as the agricultural potential of the area as measured by agro climatic 
conditions, ),,( 321 αααα =  denotes the parameters of interest. Equation (1) models the 
outcome, Yi as linearly dependent on IPi, Xi, and Zi.  Equation (1) cannot be estimated 
using OLS because IP may be correlated withμ . Estimation of equation (1) without 
controlling for self-selection, non-random program placement, and spillover effects leads 
to biased estimates of the NAADS impactα . Failure to account for the self-selection into 
the program leads to biased estimates (Heckman, 1979). 
X and Z are assumed to be orthogonal to iμ . However, IPi is correlated with iμ . 
Equation 1 has limitations. Linearity in IP entails that the program has the same marginal 
impacts for everyone. However, consistent estimation allowing for idiosyncratic impacts 
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on outcomes at given X and Z is not possible unless the idiosyncratic factors do not 
influence program placement (Baker, 2000). 
Recall from Chapter 3 that some farmers in control sub-counties in a treatment 
sub-county would have participated if their sub-county had not been excluded. This 
feature of “partial decentralization” is the subject of (Ravallion, 2006), who observes that 
the possibility to find suitable control variables for geographical placement may help 
solve the problem of non-random program placement since the problem can then be cast 
as that of selection on observables. Controlling for sub-county fixed effects and taking 
into account program placement rules, we can estimate the impacts of NAADS on the 
participants. In essence selection of a particular sub-county to participate is choosing 
individuals in that sub-county to participate in the program (although, as we noted the 
previous section not all farmers choose to participate). Therefore, the allocation of 
NAADS to a particular individual depends on whether or not the program has been 
placed in his/her area of residence, denoted by the geographical placement, GP. The 
model for individual placement is denoted by 
iiii XGPIP ναββ +′++= 210         (2) 
where v is an error term capturing the unobserved influences on individual placement and 
),,( 210 αβββ = denotes parameters of interest. The endogeneity of program placement 
implies that the error term in equation (1) is correlated with the error term in equation (2). 
Assuming that iGP  is not correlated with iμ , We can obtain consistent estimates of 
program effects with a single cross-section survey (Baker, 2000; Ravallion, 2006). 
However, biased estimates can result if there is omitted geographic heterogeneity which 
jointly is correlated with program placement and the value of farm production per acre. 
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Descriptive statistics 
The next sub-section presents the descriptive statistics to answer some of the 
questions raised in sub-section 3.5. We perform simple statistical tests on whether there is 
a difference between the means of selected variables across NAADS and non-NAADS 
farmers. Under the null hypothesis that there is equality in means between NAADS and 
non-NAADS farmers, we reject the null if the p-value is less than the level of 
significance (at 1 percent, 5 percent or 10 percent). However, caution must be taken in 
generalizing these results, since they are based on simple comparisons between NAADS 
and non-NAADS farmers and thus, do not take into account the non-random program 
placements and self-selection problems. 
Table 4 compares the average characteristics of NAADS farmers with the 
different control groups. Panel A compares selected variables between NAADS and non-
NAADS farmers in a NAADS district and a non-NAADS district. Since Kayunga district 
was chosen as a control district in our sample, it is useful to compare non-NAADS 
farmers in Kayunga district to NAADS farmers in the neighboring NAADS district of 
Mukono. The NAADS farmers are those interviewed in Kasawo sub-county, a NAADS 
sub-county in Mukono district. The non-NAADS farmers sampled from Kayunga district 
are from Kangulumira sub-county, a neighboring sub-county to Kasawo. 
At the 10 percent statistical significance, the equality of means is rejected for the 
education level of the household head, vanilla and cattle dummies, value of livestock and 
proximity to sub-county. For all these variables, the NAADS averages exceed those of 
non-NAADS farmers. NAADS farmers have more years of schooling. Relative to non-
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NAADS farmers, more NAADS farmers grow vanilla. More NAADS farmers rear cattle 
than non-NAADS farmers. In addition, NAADS farmers are more likely to stay closer to 
where a technology demonstration site is located than the non-NAADS farmers. 
At the 5 percent statistical significance, the equality of means is rejected for the 
value of farm equipment, amount of land owned and rented, and the number of farmers 
rearing poultry, goats or sheep. The null is also rejected for whether a farmer kept farm 
records or not and whether a farmer stays near a feeder road or not. For all these 
variables, the averages for NAADS farmers exceed those of non-NAADS farmers. For 
the rest of the variables, the null cannot be rejected. 
Panel B compares NAADS farmers with all non-NAADS farmers in non-NAADS 
sub-counties within NAADS districts in the sample. This case excludes non-NAADS 
farmers within NAADS sub-counties and farmers in non-NAADS districts. At the 10 
percent statistical significance, the null is rejected for the value of household assets, the 
dummy for growing root tubers, and whether a farmer has used manure or not. For these 
variables, the NAADS averages exceed the non-NAADS averages. At the 5 percent 
statistical significance, the null is rejected for education of the household head, 
dependency ratio, value of farm equipment, value of livestock, days spent learning at the 
sub-county, says spent attending at the farm, whether a farmer is aware of any local 
village political elections after 2001, closeness to a periodic market, and if a farmer 
participated in the most recent local political elections. For these variables the average 
characteristics of NAADS farmers exceed those of the non-NAADS farmers except for 
dependency ratio, number of days spent on the farm, and proximity to the market. Non-
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NAADS farmers on average have many children less than 14 years old, spend on average 
24 days on the farm, and are more likely to be closer to the nearby markets. 
Panel C compares NAADS farmers with all non-NAADS farmers in the sample. 
At the 10 percent statistical significance, the null is rejected for whether the farmer keeps 
records or not, whether the farmer is satisfied with the management by the sub-county 
authorities, and whether a farmer participated in the most recent local political elections. 
At the 5 percent statistical significance, the null is rejected for the education of the 
household head, dependency ratio, the number of days spent on social gatherings and 
attending to the farm, whether a farmer was aware of any local village political elections 
after 2001, and whether a farmer is satisfied with the mobilization efforts of the sub-
county authorities. At the 1 percent statistical significance, the null is rejected for the 
dummy for root tubers, whether a farmer used manure or not and the days spent learning 
at the sub-county. NAADS farmers spend an average of 2 days a month in learning at the 
sub-county. Overall, the null is not rejected for most of the variables in Table 5. 
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Table 4. Descriptive statistics for selected variables, NAADS and non-NAADS farmers in the study sites 
  
Panel A Panel B Panel C 
Variable Description 
NAADs 
Non-
NAADs p-value NAADs 
Non-
NAADs p-value NAADs 
Non-
NAADs p-value 
 Number of observations 
45 47  129 60  129 176  
Sex Sex of household head (1=male) 
0.767 0.766 0.983 0.782 0.759 0.735 0.782 0.798 0.739 
Age Age of household head 47.04 45.53 0.517 49.53 44.1 0.121 49.53 44.869 0.06** 
Educ Education level of head in years 8.953 6.48 0.054* 8.51 6.044 0.049** 8.507 6.916 0.109 
Hhsize Household (hh) size 6.56 5.71 0.274 6.73 5.43 0.114 6.73 5.98 0.175 
Depratio Dependency ratio = number of young hh members 
(less than 14 years old)  to hhsize 0.391 0.41 0.663 0.376 0.419 0.011** 0.376 0.42 0.042** 
Vhhassets Value of household assets+ 1747 1549 0.478 1952 1413 0.074* 1952 1942.9 0.987 
Fequip Value of farm equipment+ 32.1 22.6 0.046** 33.3 19.7 0.025** 33.3 26.1 0.136 
Totareao Amount of land owned (in acres) 4.92 4.002 0.044** 4.363 3.998 0.146 4.363 4.201 0.702 
Totarear Amount of land rented (in acres) 2.19 1.22 0.029** 1.567 1.258 0.567 1.56 1.53 0.947 
B117 Access to credit= 1 if access any form of credit; 0 
otherwise 0.219 0.341 0.558 0.568 0.228 0.22 0.568 0.307 0.199 
cyval Value of crop yield (in kilograms per acre)+ 169.9 186.1 0.697 155.8 196.1 0.27 155.8 200.3 0.165 
Fru_veg Fruit and vegetables 0.233 0.228 0.899 0.277 0.208 0.414 0.278 0.271 0.934 
Coffee Coffee 0.465 0.239 0.255 0.196 0.295 0.353 0.196 0.219 0.815 
Matooke Matooke 0.5116 0.375 0.493 0.265 0.444 0.124 0.265 0.3718 0.252 
Vanilla Vanilla 0.326 0.094 0.059* 0.129 0.118 0.908 0.129 0.1087 0.826 
Grain Grains 0.627 0.792 0.242 0.810 0.756 0.411 0.81 0.835 0.712 
Rice Rice 0.093 0.033 0.297 0.068 0.282 0.531 0.068 0.052 0.787 
Legume Legumes 0.767 0.717 0.611 0.806 0.688 0.185 0.806 0.686 0.141 
Gnuts Groundnuts 0.1627 0.188 0.767 0.124 0.211 0.287 0.124 0.235 0.315 
Tuber Tuber 0.837 0.726 0.113 0.818 0.705 0.058* 0.818 0.716 0.003*** 
Irish Irish    0.328 0.044 0.287 0.328 0.1294 0.354 
Vlstock Value of livestock 517.6 271.4 0.095* 511.3 214.3 0.024** 511.3 330.4 0.131 
Poultry Poultry 0.833 0.626 0.021** 0.597 0.657 0.787 0.598 0.6751 0.787 
Goat/sheep Goat/Sheep 0.785 0.656 0.048** 0.744 0.647 0.273 0.743 0.6478 0.273 
Cattle Cattle 0.619 0.512 0.07* 0.552 0.514 0.662 0.552 0.5138 0.662 
Pigs Pigs 0.643 0.302 0 0.435 0.305 0.223 0.436 0.3051 0.223 
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Bee keeper Bee keeper 0 0.006 0.19 0.015 0.002 0.188 0.015 0.0024 0.188 
Usedfert Whether used fertilizer 0.0697 0.107 0.151 0.125 0.094 0.665 0.125 0.088 0.487 
Usedman Whether used manure 0.534 0.412 0.247 0.623 0.344 0.059* 0.623 0.342 0.008*** 
Kprecord Whether keep farm records 0.452 0.207 0.014** 0.343 0.192 0.25 0.343 0.159 0.083* 
B120l Learning at sub-county 1.814 0.807 0.210 1.97 0.485 0.021** 1.978 0.642 0.000*** 
B120i Interacting with fellow farmers 2.883 4.374 0.186 3.07 4.67 0.157 3.07 4.18 0.1652 
B120s Social gatherings (e.g., attending weddings) 2.906 5.14 0.048** 3.66 5.4 0.109 3.656 5.094 0.055** 
B120a Attending to farm 23.63 23.43 0.909 21.76 24.2 0.024** 21.76 23.61 0.012** 
Local =1 if farmer was aware of any local village 
political elections after 2001;  0 otherwise 0.953 0.906 0.26 0.976 0.885 0.01** 0.976 0.918 0.029** 
Nearroad Near road 0.711 0.947 0.041** 0.808 0.965 0.256  0.8778 0.554 
Nearsc Near sub-county 0.595 0.774 0.062* 0.744 0.757 0.885 0.744 0.7686 0.747 
nearTDS Near Technology Demonstration Site 0.833 0.776 0.64 0.713 0.805 0.378 0.713 0.5745 0.386 
nearpmkt Near periodic Markets 0.609 0.789 0.305 0.591 0.842 0.056** 0.591 0.738 0.142 
Sat_man =1 if farmer was very satisfied or satisfied with 
management of activities at sub-county; 0 
otherwise 0.93 0.860 0.145 0.919 0.846 0.151 0.919 0.835 0.073* 
Sat_mob =1 if farmer was very satisfied or satisfied with 
mobilization efforts by the sub-county; 0 otherwise 0.976 0.875 0.1 0.947 0.862 0.197 0.947 0.8509 0.021** 
B115 =1 if a farmer participated in the most recent local 
political elections; 0 otherwise 0.837 0.719 0.379 0.887 0.668 0.05** 0.887 0.748 0.073* 
B119 =1 if a farmer has close and good relations with 
lower levels leaders at village or SC; 0 else 0.883 0.878 0.83 0.87 0.882 0.426 0.871 0.887 0.408 
vfm Value of the Farm+ 230.1 221.8 0.825 193.0 235.3 0.187 193.0 222.7 0.421 
1 The dummies were created by classifying specific crops out of the 40 crops listed in the questionnaire in Table A1. frui_veg dummy =1 if crops are 
fruits (lemons, oranges, passion fruits, pineapples, mangoes, paw paws, water melon) and vegetables (onions, cabbages, tomatoes, spinach, carrots, 
others) and zero otherwise.  Matooke dummy =1 if type of bananas is sweet, food-type or beer-type and zero otherwise. Grain dummy =1 if crop is 
maize, finger millet, sorghum and zero otherwise. Legumes dummy =1 if crop is beans, field peas, cow peas, soya beans, and sim sim and zero 
otherwise; Gnuts =1 if crop is ground nuts; zero otherwise. Tuber =1 if crop is cassava, sweet potato; zero otherwise. Irish =1 if crop is irish potato; zero 
otherwise. Other cash=1 if crop is tea or tobacco; zero otherwise. Vanilla =1 if crop is vanilla. 
+ One U.S. Dollar is equivalent to 1800 Uganda Shillings 
*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent respectively. 
Panel a = Control group is non-NAADS farmers within non-NAADS district; Panel b = Control group is non-NAADS farmers within non-NAADS sub-
counties in NAADS districts; and Panel c = Control group is non-NAADS farmers in the entire sample. 
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Next, we present additional descriptive statistics with respect to the additional 
questions that we asked only NAADS farmers. These questions were specifically aimed 
at eliciting information from program participants to understand how they perceived 
specific aspects of the NAADS program. Caution must be taken to interpret these results 
since they are drawn from a selected sample (only NAADS farmers). Table 6 presents the 
descriptive statistics for participating (NAADS) farmers. We found that on average 88 
percent and 75 percent are satisfied with the services of the PSPs and are willing to 
purchase advisory services (if there was a private company providing advisory services at 
some fee) respectively. However, these numbers conceal the variations in satisfaction 
across different enterprises. For example, participating farmers are generally satisfied 
with the services under certain enterprises such as Irish and piggery projects but not 
poultry. 
On average most farmers belong to more than one farmers’ group, probably 
revealing how important different enterprises are to the farmers’ quest for improved 
farming or how important farmer institutional development is under NAADS. The 
average co-funding (and other expenses such as contributions to run demonstration sites) 
varies across farmers. On average a farmer contributes 3.15 U.S. dollars a year in co-
funding. However, some farmers do not pay but still belong to the program. Over 94 
percent of the farmers have paid their co-funding. This figure is consistent with the 
evidence from the document reviews at the NAADS secretariat. Generally, the efforts to 
improve the farmers’ organizational abilities through improved record keeping are low 
with only 39 percent of the farmers indicating that they keep records on output and inputs 
(our random checks with some farmers to produce the records revealed that even those 
  
83
 
who said keep records could not produce them at interview claiming either they were too 
far or locked up somewhere in the house). 
 
Table 5: Additional descriptive statistics for participating (NAADS) farmers 
Variable 
Name 
Definition Obs. mean Std. 
dev 
Min Max 
Quality of Extension and Access , Farmer Institutions, Co-financing, and Technology Access 
satq_psp Satisfied with services of PSPs 127 0.882 0.324 0 1 
nfgroup No. of farmers’ groups a farmer belongs 126 1.667 0.876 1 4 
paidcf Have you paid co-funding? 125 0.944 0.230 0 1 
Avgfg Average payments made in co-funding** 126 3.153 4.444 0 25 
Will Willing to purchase extension 125 0.75 0.433 0 1 
Kprecord Do you keep output and input records? 125 0.392 0.490 0 1 
nearTDS Are you near a TDS? 83 0.723 0.450 0 1 
visitTDS Have you visited a TDS before? 118 0.779 0.416 0 1 
Train6 Received agric. training in last 6 months 126 0.849 0.359 0 1 
Attend Attended last advisory/farmer group meetings 125 0.912 0.284 0 1 
Source of information  on prices of agric. Output (percentage reported) 
  1st choice 
(n= 120) 
2nd choice 
(n =112) 
3rd choice 
(n=83) 
 PSPs 5.83  1.79  10.84 
 Radio 12.50  16.07  4.82 
 Nearby Market 34.17  28.57  18.07 
 Neighbor/Friend 9.17  23.21  21.69 
 Price offered by buyer 8.33  5.36  12.05 
 I negotiate (buyer and farmer) 28.33  24.11  31.33 
 Other 1.67  0.89  1.20 
How did you learn about NAADS? 
  1st choice 
(n=128) 
2nd choice 
(n=121) 
3rd choice  
( n=98) 
 Extension agent/PSPs 26.56  19.83  16.33 
 Radio/Television 17.19  24.79  15.31 
 Neighbor/Friend 9.38  15.70  18.37 
 Local government Official (SC chief, L.C) 21.09  19.01  15.31 
 Member of Parliament 0.78  -  - 
 NAADS Coordinator/Official 20.31  18.18  31.63 
 Others 3.91  2.48  3.06 
 
Rating the relevance of different sources of extension sources (percentage reported) 
 
  Most Least Not Don’t know 
 PSPs (n =123) 90.24 6.50 1.63 1.63  
 Neighbors (n = 119) 47.90 39.50 10.92 1.68  
 Manuals/Flyers (n =100) 17 33 24 26  
 Television (n=95) 16.84 12.63 40 30.53  
 Radio (n=85) 56.47 27.06 12.94 3.53  
 Cell phone (n =71) 19.72 16.90 35.21 26.76  
Source: Author’s computation. 
** Assumption:1 U.S. dollar = 1,800 Uganda Shillings. 
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We found that over 90 percent of the participating farmers attended the last 
advisory services session or the farmers’ group meetings. About 85 percent revealed to 
have received agricultural training in the last 6 months and over 70 percent have at least 
visited a technology demonstration site before. Most participating farmers revealed 
satisfaction with the way the sub-county manages sub-county activities or mobilizes them 
to work together. Participating farmers are also active in local political decision making 
processes. 
It turns out from our sample that farmers mostly obtain information about prices 
of agricultural output from nearby markets (34.2 percent) and the least from PSPs (5.83 
percent). Negotiations (between the buyer and the farmers), radio and neighbors are also 
a common source of information of price determination. However, PSPs are rated the 
most relevant source of extension services among farmers. The radio and the neighbors 
are also rated highly as sources of extension services. Also, most farmers reveal that they 
first learnt about NAADS from PSPs, local government officials and NAADS 
coordinators. Unfortunately, Members of Parliament (MPs) are an unimportant source 
about NAADS. 
 
Testing for endogeneity 
 
We begin the analysis by testing for endogeneity using the Durbin-Wu-Hausman 
(DWH) test for endogeneity in IV estimation. Applying IV estimation when indeed the 
regressors are uncorrelated with the disturbance term results in loss of efficiency 
(Wooldridge, 2006). The asymptotic variance of the IV estimator is always larger than 
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the asymptotic variance of the OLS estimator (Baum, 2006). The Hausman (1978) test 
for endogeneity is formed by choosing OLS as the efficient estimator and the IV as the 
inefficient but consistent estimator. In other words, by choosing OLS, only efficiency is 
lost by turning to IV (Baum, 2006). As shown in the Table 6 the Wu-Hausman F test 
(with p-value = 0.6386) and the DWH chi-square test statistic (with p-value = 0.6225) 
failed to reject the null hypothesis of an exogenous type of farmer (NAADS) tof variable. 
This result is contrary to the earlier expectation that the type of farmer is endogenously 
determined. However, since the Hausman tests does not explicitly state an alterative 
hypothesis and therefore need not have high power against particular alternatives 
Cameron & Trivedi (2005), it is not surprising that we don’t reject the null. Despite this 
result, we present both results of IV and OLS for comparison. 
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Table 6. IV Estimation, identification and related tests 
Test statistic Statistic value p-value 
Tests for endogeneity   
Wu-Hausman F test 0.21981 0.6396 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman Chi-square test 0.2424 0.6225 
Tests for overidentifying restrictions   
Sargan NR-squared 1.873 0.3921 
Basmann test 1.702 0.4271 
Shea-partial R-squared 0.3937 0.000 
Anderson Canonical LR statistic 133.09 0.000 
Tests for heteroskedasticity   
Pagan-Hall General test statistic 28.581 0.2818 
Pagan-Hall test w/assumed normality 32.716 0.1383 
White/Koenker nR2 test statistic 33.835 0.1115 
Breusch-Pagan/Godfrey/Cook-Iisberg 39.019 0.0367 
Source: Author’s computation 
 
Keeping the assumption that tof is endogenous implies loss of efficiency. 
However, if OLS is biased and inconsistent, then the loss of efficiency due to IV may be 
worth (Baum, 2006). For this reason, we proceed to model the IV estimation using as 
instruments for tof the quality of development plan (qdp), the level of monitoring and 
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evaluation capacity of the local government (ME), the level of accountability (AC) and 
the local revenue performance (LRP). 
 
Identification, tests for overidentifying restrictions and testing for Weak 
instruments 
The parameters in an equation are said to be identified when we have sufficient 
valid instruments so that the 2SLS estimator produces unique estimators. The parameters 
of exactly identified equations can be estimated by IV. Under the null hypothesis that the 
instruments are uncorrelated with the error term, we test for overidentification using the 
Sargan and Basmann tests (Baum, 2006). The results are presented in Table 6. The p-
values of the Sargan and Basmann tests are 0.3921 and 0.4271 respectively indicating 
that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the instruments are excludable from the 
second stage equation. We also performed tests for the relevance of instruments using the 
R-squared of the first-stage regression with the included instruments partialled out. This 
statistic proposed by Bound, Jaeger, & Baker (1995) can diagnose instrument relevance 
only in the presence of one endogenous regressor. We also performed a conditional 
likelihood ratio test of Weak instruments proposed by (Moreira & Poi, 2001).32 The 
partial R-squared (based on the first stage results) from performing this test was 0.486. 
Our IVs are not quite highly correlated with the endogenous variable. 
Another measure reported here is Shea’s partial R-squared measure that takes the 
intercorrelations among the instruments into account. The rule of thumb is that if an 
                                                 
32 A weak instrument is said to occur in the presence of multiple regressors with only one endogenous when 
the partial R-Squared is low or the partial  F-Statistic is small (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005; Stock, Wright, 
and Yogo, 2002). This test was conducted using condivreg command in Stata. The post estimation testing 
and construction of confidence intervals were conducted using, condtest and condgraph commands in stata. 
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estimated equation yields a large value of the standard partial R-squared and a small 
value of the Shea measure, we conclude that the instruments lack sufficient relevance to 
explain the endogenous regressor (s). In other words, the model is underidentified. Lastly, 
we also report the Anderson’s likelihood ratio-test. A failure to reject the null hypothesis 
for this test calls the identification status of the equation into question. Lastly, we report 
results of the redundancy test. Under the null hypothesis that the specified instruments are 
redundant, the statistic is distributed as a chi-square with degrees of freedom equal to the 
number of endogenous regressors times the number of instruments being tested. The 
results are presented in Table 6. The tests indicate that the instruments specified in the 
value of crop production are relevant. 
Lastly, we tested for heteroskedasticity in the IV model. Under the null of 
conditional homoscedasticity in the 2SLS, the Breush-Pagan test and Whites tests for 
heteroskedasticity are reported in Table 6. The tests based on the ivhetest, all command in 
Stata reveals that heteroskedasticity is not a problem in the estimated equation’s 
disturbance process. Table 7 presents the IV estimates of the value of the farm production 
per acre discussed below. The first stage regression results of tof are reported in the Table 
A8. 
The results in that Table A8 indicate that education and age of the household head 
are positively and statistically significant in the participation equation. Sex is positive and 
statistically insignificant in the participation equation. Similarly, household size is 
positive and statistically significant in the NAADS participation equation. Access to 
credit is positive and statistically significant in the participation equation. However, 
although the availability of land is positively related to participation in NAADS, it is not 
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statistically significant. Closeness to markets is positive, statistically insignificant in the 
participation equation. Closeness to a feeder road is negative, statistically insignificant in 
the participation equation. Having farm equipment is positively related to participation in 
NAADS, although statistically insignificant. The availability of household assets is 
negatively related and statistically insignificant in the participation equation. 
Although sub-counties with better communication and accountability mechanisms 
and with a better local revenue performance positively influence participation in 
NAADS, the presence of a quality development plan at the sub-county is negatively 
related to participation in NAADS. The governance factors are each statistically 
significant in the participation equation. Household awareness of local voting processes 
and whether he/she is satisfied with the management of sub-county authorities are 
positive but statistically insignificant in the participation equation. Political connectivity 
of a farmer is negative and statistically insignificant. 
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Table 7. IV and OLS estimates for the log of the value of farm production per acre 
 OLS Estimates IV Estimates 
 Coefficient Standard 
Errors 
Coefficient Standard 
Errors 
Type of farmer (1= NAADS; 0, otherwise) 0.179* 0.099 -0.021 0.172 
Agro climatic dummy (1= southern highlands; zero 
elsewhere) 0.677 0.412 0.430 0.451 
Agro climatic dummy (1 = Eastern region; zero 
elsewhere) -0.908*** 0.220 -0.754** 0.246 
Average rainfall for the period 2004-2005. 0.042** 0.013 0.033* 0.015 
Dummy for near period market (1 = near market) -0.101 0.096 -0.089 0.097 
Near feeder road (1 = near road; 0 otherwise) -0.098 0.111 -0.090 0.112 
Land in acres (logarithm) -1.565*** 0.108 -1.548*** 0.110 
Square of land in acres (logarithm) 0.091* 0.037 0.086* 0.037 
Logarithm of farm equipment 0.093* 0.046 0.092* 0.047 
Logarithm of household assets 0.154*** 0.043 0.147*** 0.044 
Education of the household head in years of schooling -0.013 0.012 -0.011 0.012 
Logarithm of age of household head -0.152 0.185 -0.102 0.190 
Log of household size 0.185 0.115 0.199* 0.117 
Dependency ratio 0.059 0.238 0.063 0.240 
Access to credit (1= access to credit; 0 otherwise) 0.080 0.106 0.114 0.109 
Sex of household head (1 = male;0 = female) 0.115 0.126 0.110 0.127 
Whether household has had a sick member -0.006 0.093 -0.005 0.094 
Whether household participated in local elections -0.005 0.232 0.022 0.235 
Political connections of the farmer -0.210 0.142 -0.215 0.143 
Whether farmer is satisfied with management of sub-
county authorities management 0.069 0.126 0.093 0.128 
Constant term 6.177*** 1.563 6.995*** 1.678 
R-Squared 
Number of Observations 
0.724 
266 
 0.719 
266 
 
Source: Author’s computations. 
 
Participation in the NAADS program as captured by the tof variable is expected to 
positively impact crop production and animal rearing and as a result on the value of the 
farm production. The 2SLS and OLS estimates of the impact of NAADS on the value of 
farm production per acre are almost identical. That indicates that the OLS estimates are 
not biased by the possible endogeneity of participating in NAADS. The 2SLS is less 
efficient (with larger standard errors) than OLS. The results indicate that NAADS has had 
a positive and statistically significant impact of approximately 20 percent on the value of 
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farm production per acre. The interpretation does not significantly change when we apply 
a sub-county fixed effects regression (Table A9). 
Better access to markets and roads can have strong positive impacts on the value 
of the farm production per acre. Surprisingly, however, the estimates presented in this 
study do not support this claim. Access to markets and roads are negatively related to the 
value of the farm production per acre, although the coefficients are statistically 
insignificant. As noted by Nkonya et al.(2004), farmers in remote areas are likely to be 
faced with high agricultural marketing transaction costs that make it unprofitable to 
produce surplus for the market. 
The availability of farm equipment (e.g., hoes and pangas) influences the 
activities on the farm. We find the logarithm of farm equipment to be positive and 
statistically significant. 
Primary education may be associated with more intensive use of labor. In this 
study we find a negative impact of education on the value of farm production per acre; 
however, this is statistically insignificant. 
Awareness of local political processes is negatively related to the value of the 
farm production per acre, but statistically insignificant. However, satisfaction with the 
management of sub-county authorities is positively related to the value of the farm 
production per acre. Local political connectivity is negatively related to value of the farm 
production per acre, but statistically insignificant. 
We would expect that having a sick member in the household negatively affects 
the value of the farm production since the farmer not only loses time but also financial 
resources (taken away from farm activities). We find that having a sick member in the 
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household is negatively related to the value of the farm, although statistically 
insignificant. 
We find positive and statistically insignificant impacts on the value of the farm 
production per acre of the dummy variable capturing agro-climatic zone two (southern 
highlands), a negative but statistically significant coefficient of the dummy for Eastern 
region (includes Tororo district); and a positive and statistically significant coefficient the 
availability of rainfall over 2004-2005. The southern highland (where Kabale district is 
located) are fertile lands, but are also heavily populated with small farms, possibly 
explaining the statistically insignificant dummy. 
The coefficient on the logarithm of land is negative and highly statistically 
significant. In other words, small firms are more productive than large firms. This result 
might be interpreted to mean that, compared with hired labor, family labor is of better 
quality, more safely entrusted with valuable animals or machinery and needs less 
monitoring or as an optimal response by small farmers to uncertainty (see Deaton, 1997). 
The square of the logarithm of land in acres is positive and statistically significant. We 
rejected the null that the joint hypothesis of the coefficient on land and land squared are 
both equal to zero. 
Household size has a positive and statistically significant coefficient. Having 
more family members aged less than 14 years is positively associated with value of farm 
production, although this coefficient is statistically insignificant. Access to credit is 
positively related to the value of farm production per acre; although statistically 
insignificant. Age of the household head is negative and statistically insignificant. Sex is 
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positive and statistically insignificant coefficient on the value of farm production per 
acre. The coefficient on household assets is positive and statistically significant. 
 
Qualitative analysis 
This section seeks to provide answers to specific questions such as: Do the PSPs 
provide the services as stipulated in the contracts; how effective are the different sub-
county level players in monitoring NAADS activities?; and do farmers and sub-counties 
co-finance their counterpart NAADS funds? Before providing answers to these questions, 
a description of the NAADS enterprises carried out in each of the sub-counties is 
provided. Table A5-A7 summarizes the NAADS enterprise profiles for the selected study 
sites since inception of the program in 2001. Some observations from Table A5-A7 
deserve discussion. 
First, there is variation in the selected enterprises across the three study sites in 
each of the fiscal years. For example, although banana growing is common in Kasawo 
sub-county and in isolated areas in Kisoko sub-county, it is not a major NAADS 
enterprise in Kabale. However, Irish potato growing enterprise is a very important 
enterprise in Kabale and not in Mukono and Tororo. The variation of projects across the 
three study sites reflects the different emphasis that farmers place on different farming 
activities. This may be driven by agro climatic conditions, cultural/historical reasons, and 
the need to diversify farming activities. For example, coffee and vanilla growing are 
common in Kasawo and not in Kisoko and Kyanamira. Historically, areas around Lake 
Victoria (of which Mukono district belongs) have been known for Robusta coffee 
growing. However, during the 1990s and early 2000, a “new” crop known as vanilla was 
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introduced in Uganda. This crop was mainly introduced as a money maker as many 
farmers cut down coffee and/or abandoned other food crops in response to the growing 
demand for vanilla at high prices. During the late 1990s and early 2000, Indonesia and 
Madagascar, the World’s leading producers of vanilla experienced a decline in 
production, partly due to weather related causes. 
By 2002, a farmer could earn between 15-25 U.S. dollars per kilogram of vanilla. 
Unfortunately, at the time of our interview, farmers expressed concern over what some 
called “wasted investments, time and energy” because vanilla prices have dropped to less 
than 2 U.S. dollars per kilogram (see Table A4). Some farmers have in fact cut down 
vanilla plants and resorted back to other food crops they grew before the “vanilla boom”. 
Hybrid coffee varieties and improved methods of Vanilla growing and processing are 
some of the activities that are being promoted by NAADS through PSPs. Our interviews 
with farmers showed that they questioned the relevance of the investments in vanilla 
improvements; ironically, it is the farmers who chose these enterprises for investment 
support under NAADS. My interpretation of this is that probably at the time farmers 
chose vanilla investment, they had little knowledge about the relationships between their 
production decisions and the international supply, which in part influence the price they 
receive. 
Second, goat management projects appear in all the three study sites. Goats are 
easier to look after, profitable, multiply faster, and a quick source of money to cushion 
negative shocks that rural households are prone to. The NAADS program is promoting 
the rearing of high breed goats (e.g., Boer goats) for meat production. In all study sites, 
farmers expressed satisfaction with the quality of the goats that are procured at the sub-
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county. One farmer in Kisoko sub-county lamented that: “with goat production, every 
farmer in NAADS in Tororo will go out of poverty”. 
The contracts for goat procurement stipulate among others the expected goat size, 
weight, and breed type of the goats. All study sites have opportunities to expand goat 
meat production which is on high demand in both rural and urban markets. However, 
farmers pointed to the lack of adequate land to rear goats on a large scale. 
Third, fish farming is predominant in Kyanamira as opposed to Kasawo and 
Kisoko sub-counties. This is because Kabale (and thus, Kyanamira) is a hilly area with 
low valleys that are suitable for fish farming. At the time of this study, very few fish 
ponds were operational in Kyanamira. Two of the operational fish ponds we visited are 
run by a NAADS youth farmers group in Muyumbu parish. The youth group had 
harvested and sold fish on two occasions, albeit in small quantities. Two other fish ponds 
located near Kyanamira sub-county were not yet operational, although record checks with 
the NAADS sub-county coordinator revealed that a PSP had been contracted to do the 
renovation. This enterprise is a promising one but not without limitations and problems. 
First, there is the concern of inadequate fish fries supply. At the time of the study, we 
were told that fish fries are obtained from a single producer located in Kajjansi, near the 
shores of Lake Victoria (near the capital city, Kampala). The second concern is that it 
could be a viable project if farmers could access financial assistance to expand the 
projects. However, although farmers think that fish farming is a viable enterprise, they 
expressed concern over the environmental damage created by the construction of fish 
ponds. 
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Known for the production of passion fruits, Kabale is also spearheading the 
growing of apples in Uganda under the support of the NAADS program. Apple growing 
in Kabale was earlier on supported by the International Center for Research in Agro 
forestry (ICRAF). At the time of our study, few farmers were growing apples. An 
interview with a NAADS farmers’ representative and a female farmer in Kyanamira 
revealed that the enterprise is profitable and they wish that it can be expanded to many 
farmers. However, farmers believe that the PSPs teaching about apple management are 
“not practical” and have varying approaches to teaching the farmers. 
The chairperson, farmers’ representative, Kyanamira sub-county said: “Some of 
us (farmers) are more knowledgeable than the so called PSPs on apple management, but 
are not given a chance under existing rules to become providers”. Thus, some farmers do 
believe that they can “even be better PSPs” than those currently teaching them about 
apple management. However, at the time of our study, the regulations prevented farmers 
from becoming PSPs. 
Lastly, Mukono and Kayunga districts specialize in the production of pineapples, 
water melons, and papaws. These districts are arguably among the leading suppliers of 
pineapples, water melons and papaws to the capital city, Kampala. During our field visits, 
we came across trucks that had come from neighboring Kenya to transport fruits from 
Mukono and Kayunga to Kenyan markets. The major concern that farmers raised is the 
trade off between having to grow pineapples on a large area (farmers claimed that good 
pineapples do not need tree shades) and the clearance of trees, thereby exposing land to 
soil erosion. The only crops intercropped with pineapples are bananas. 
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The purpose of the above enterprise description was to highlight some of the 
NAADS activities carried in the study sites that we visited. The strengths and the general 
concerns of the selected enterprises are also noted. In the next sub-section, analysis of 
specific NAADS program features is conducted. This is accomplished by answering the 
questions raised in the previous chapter. Our focus is on the role of PSPs, the local 
government authorities and farmers’ institutions. 
 
Are PSPs providing the services as stipulated in the contracts? 
 
A NAADS farmer in Kasawo sub-county, commented: generally, PSPs do their 
job: they deliver the services; however, the quality of these services is usually poor, 
particularly for poultry in Kasawo sub-county. we interviewed NAADS sub-county 
coordinators, community development officers and farmers’ representatives to provide 
their own assessments on the above question. The assessment involved file reviews of 
past PSP contracts as well as understanding the progress and challenges met in 
implementing each of the contracts with the PSPs. Table A5-A7 shows the assessments 
of the PSP contracts since the inception of the NAADS program in the study sites. 
Generally, in all study sites most PSPs do complete their contractual obligations 
to the farmers; however, there are concerns with respect to the quality of the services. 
From Table A5-A7, examples of unsatisfactory PSP services include the banana, vanilla, 
and local chicken improvement projects in Kasawo sub-county. In Kisoko sub-county 
concerns were mainly with the quality of services under the local poultry contracts. In the 
previous section we noted that in Kyanamira sub-county farmers expressed concerns 
about the variations in training approaches among apple PSPs. This observation was 
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found to be consistent with respect to the responses from the focus-group discussions in 
Kyanamira. 
With respect to the Irish potato growing scheme, farmers are generally satisfied 
with the training provided by the PSPs under NAADS; however, they pointed out the 
inadequacy of the potato seeds supplied to the farmers. In addition, farmers were 
generally dissatisfied with the knowledge they were taught on pest control for Irish 
potato. Indeed, pests are a major problem facing Irish potato growers in Kyanamira that 
require immediate attention from the concerned authorities (i.e., NAADS, MAAIF). In 
addition, farmers in Kyanamira sub-county suggested the need for an extra component of 
training in the preparation of potato seeds. 
Other challenges affecting the status of enterprises include the untimely 
implementation (e.g., toward the end of the agricultural season), and the availability of 
few competent service providers. The desk reviews revealed that some sub-counties have 
to source PSPs from distant areas. This raises the costs associated with contracting 
advisory services. There is also the problem of low skilled staff at the sub-county. This 
slows the decision making processes as well as the utilization of resources and the 
reporting and accountability for program funds. 
Farmers are grateful for the access to knowledge through demonstration sites. 
However, the replication of the technologies by the farmers is mixed. In Kyanamira, 
although farmers expressed their satisfaction with the knowledge acquired from the 
establishment of modern storage facilities, adoption to their own farms as revealed by the 
farmers in discussion groups is still limited. The same finding is supported by the 
interviews with key informants. 
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The procurement committees (PCs) are vigilant in canceling contracts with PSPs 
whenever sub-standard work is delivered. They are also vigilant in ensuring that the 
reporting mechanisms by the PSPs are adhered to. The PSPs must sign the farmers’ group 
visitors’ book whenever training is conducted. The members of the farmers’ fora get a 
copy of the planned work schedule (e.g., training) by the PSPs and use it in checking 
whether the work has been done or not. Our assessments reveal that the farmers are aware 
and practice the reporting mechanism. Farmers sign attendance sheets after confirming 
that they have received training or the expected deliverables.33 
Sub-counties enforce the payment schedules of the contracts and in some cases 
institute extra measures to delay extra payments to the PSP unless the amount of work 
done is satisfactory. This was particularly the case in Kyanamira sub-county, Kabale 
district. In the neighboring sub-counties of Rubaya and Bukinda, PSPs that had not 
delivered on the stipulated work were made to refund the monies and their contracts were 
terminated. 
However, there are obstacles that the sub-county authorities face. For example, 
they mentioned the delay of funds either from the district or the center. Of more concern 
is that some disbursements of quarterly releases come late, and this puts pressure on the 
local authorities to spend the money before the end of the quarter. As a result, the 
                                                 
33 The exception to this is a story of what happened in Nagongera sub-county, neighboring Kisoko sub-
county in Tororo district.  Nagongera was one of the “early NAADS sub-counties” but one which was 
scrapped off the program due to collusion between local government authorities and the PSPs. Exploring 
the ignorance of farmers, a PSP colluding with sub-county authorities reported that he had conducted 
training yet it was not true. Fortunately, the NAADS district authorities and the Secretariat intervened; 
although the repercussions eventually resulted in suspension of Nagongera from the NAADS program. 
Probably scrapping the program was not the best thing to do; since the beneficiaries were also penalized-
but the fact that swift measures were taken depicts the existence of measures within NAADS to 
enforce/terminate contracts.  
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processes of contracting are done in a rush, which NAADs sub-coordinators admit may 
affect value for money. Also, although there is almost 100 percent match between what 
the sub-counties budget and the actual releases, limited funds are earmarked for 
monitoring NAADS activities. For example, based on the 2004 NAADS funds release 
estimates, the budget per sub-county (i.e., sub-counties one year old with NAADS) 
earmarked for monitoring and evaluation was 1.98, 2.0 and 1.83 million Uganda shillings 
for Mukono, Kabale and Tororo districts, respectively (NAADS MIS, 2004). 34 
The farmers’ forum is supposed to monitor the PSPs and in general do routine 
supervision of NAADS activities in the sub-county; due to inadequate funds for 
monitoring, the forum hardly does so. In fact, the concern raised by all the NAADS 
coordinators in all the study sites is that members of the farmers’ forum only monitor if 
they know that their allowances for monitoring are available; otherwise they don’t. 
 
How effective are the different sub-county level players in monitoring NAADS activities? 
 
A NAADS coordinator said: Monitoring by farmers’ representatives has been 
monetized; without money, they cannot monitor...And local political leaders tend to 
intensify monitoring of NAADS programs when local elections are nearby. 
On a scale of 1-4 (1 = Weak [don’t monitor], 2 = fair [sometimes monitor], 3 = 
active [often monitor], and 4 =very active[regularly monitor]), we asked the NAADS 
sub-coordinators to rank and explain the effectiveness of farmers, farmers’ 
                                                 
34 Roughly this translates into about 1,000 U.S. dollars per sub-county per year (assuming 1 U.S. dollar = 
1,800 Uganda shillings). 
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representatives, local political leadership, sub-county chiefs and sub-county NAADS 
coordinators in monitoring NAADS activities at the sub-county. 
Farmers are not active (but fair) in communicating to the sub-county authorities 
about the progress of NAADS activities in their sub-counties. The sub-county NAADS 
coordinators claim that this is attributed to the illiteracy levels of the participating 
farmers. However, the recent formation of Parish Coordinating Committees (PCCs) is 
expected to bridge the information flow gap between the farmers and the sub-county. 35 
The farmers’ representatives are active in monitoring NAADS activities in the sub-
counties. However, we found that farmers’ representatives do monitor only when there 
are funds available for them to monitor NAADS activities. Given that the earmarked 
funds for monitoring at the sub-county are limited and have to be allocated among 
various monitoring agents (e.g., sub-county NAADS coordinators, farmers’ 
representatives), monitoring of NAADS activities as noted above is in general limited. 
This raises a very important question of whether the services provided by the PSPs are 
accomplished according to the contractual obligations. It also becomes very difficult to 
keep track of what types of PSPs (individuals, NGOs, private firms) are delivering the 
right services to the farmers. If we are to expect increased agricultural outcomes (e.g., 
increased crop yields and knowledge) and thus anticipate increased household incomes 
                                                 
35 Parishes are the next lower administrative units after sub-counties; however, unlike sub-counties, 
parishes are not the core unit of decentralized service delivery. In fact, the administrative structures of sub-
counties have been established from the colonial days in the 1960s. In the study sites we surveyed, a typical 
sub-county constitutes between 4 to 6 parishes. At the inception of the NAADS program, parishes had no 
role to play in agricultural extension service delivery. However, implementation of the NAADS program 
became much harder without involving parish level authorities (e.g., chiefs) who are much closer to the 
farmers than do the sub-county authorities. Prior to the formation of the PCCs, NAADS farmers hardly got 
feedback from their representatives on the deliberations held at the sub-county. This was the case in all the 
study sites we visited. However, the PCC lacks the capacity and equipment (e.g., bicycles) to perform their 
duties. In addition, there are no incentives in terms of better allowances for them to monitor the NAADS 
program. 
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and poverty reduction, there must be a clear strategy on monitoring the PSPs to ensure 
that the kind of services received are those that the farmers actually demand. 
We found that some NGOs are responsive to the needs of the farmers and indeed 
farmers expressed satisfaction of their services. An example is World Vision, an 
International NGO that is actively involved in NAADS activities in Mukono district. On 
the other hand, some private individual providers are not very responsive to farmers’ 
needs. This is particularly true in Kasawo sub-county poultry projects; however, in 
Tororo and Kabale districts, individual service providers are much more proactive and 
likely to deliver their services according to the contractual obligations. 
The sub-county political leader of government business, known as the LC3 
Chairpersons, are said to be active in monitoring NAADS activities. However, in general 
the other LC3 council members representing the different parishes with a particular sub-
county and groups of people in the sub-county do not. The council members too monitor 
only when there are allowances from the sub-county for them to do so. The sub-county 
chiefs are ranked fair (meaning they sometimes monitor), with variations. The SNC are 
rated active (meaning that thy regularly monitor); but constrained because NAADS 
activities have grown and this implies many responsibilities. They reported that the 
monitoring resources are limited. Generally, SNC officials revealed that they execute 
their assigned duties as per NAADS guidelines, but complained of “being overstretched 
into doing other sub-county activities”. 
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Farmer group dynamics and technology demonstration site (TDS) management 
Since the NAADS program focal point is farmers’ groups, it is important to ask 
questions relevant for farmer group formation and sustainability. One of the successes of 
NAADS since its inception is the formation of active farmers’ groups. Although, some 
groups dropped out at inception (probably because of different expectations of NAADS), 
registered farmers groups have increased to over 13,202 in 2005. As we noted in Chapter 
2, farmer group member representation takes into gender into account. Farmers groups 
hold meetings regularly, mobilize funds, and are eager to learn at the sub-counties. This 
was especially true in Kyanamira and Kisoko sub-counties than in Kasawo sub-county. In 
the latter, some farmers claimed lack of transparency among some group members when 
it comes to seed sharing and the placement of technological demonstration sites. 
In general, there are challenges with respect to TDS management. First, in some 
groups farmers have neglected the collective responsibility of looking after TDS. The 
examples include the piggery projects in Kisoko and Kasawo sub-counties where some 
host farmers have solely taken over the care and feeding obligations yet it is supposed to 
be a group responsibility. There are also isolated instances in which the some TDS host 
farmers have neglected the responsibilities delegated to them by fellow group members. 
An example is that of a bull TDS host farmer in Kasawo who abandoned the bull without 
feeding and care until the SNC came to its rescue. A working solution is currently being 
implemented were the host farmer agrees to pass-on the young ones (e.g., piglets) to each 
group member so that responsibility is shared. 
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Do the farmers and sub-counties co-finance their counterpart NAADS funds? 
A NAADS sub-county coordinator in Kabale; a farmers’ representative in 
Kyanamira sub-county, and a female farmer on the procurement committee in Tororo 
said: Farmers are eager to co-finance under NAADS. Indeed many of them contribute 
with happiness because they own NAADS. 
We asked farmers (both in the survey and in the focus group discussions) about 
their co-financing obligations of the NAADS program. We found that farmers are active 
and most of them have paid up their required co-funding of the NAADS program. This 
perhaps reveals how important the participating farmers feel about the co-ownership and 
expectations about the NAADS program. On the contrary, sub-county governments 
barely meet their annual co-financing contributions towards the NAADS program. Based 
on the study sites, Kasawo and Kisoko sub-counties had not paid co-funding requirement 
for the fiscal year 2005. The responses for the failure of sub-counties to co-finance lead 
to the general answer that they lack revenue sources, especially following the scrapping 
of graduated tax and  market dues, which were the main tax handles at the sub-county 
level. In addition, there have been delays in releasing the compensation funds that the 
central government pledged as a replacement for the revenue loss at the sub-counties. 
Unfortunately, we find that farmers are beginning to shoulder the burden of the 
sub-county in addition to meeting their financial obligations. This is either in the form of 
farmers’ groups putting money together to assist the local government or planting a 
garden for the sub-county or increasing their co-funding requirements. This was the case 
in Kisoko and Kasawo sub-counties. Although this reveals how farmers are getting 
attached to contract extension, there is urgent need to address the imbalance since the 
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sub-county authorities claim they will meet their co-funding obligations only when 
central government sends the promised grants to cushion their inability to collect enough 
taxes. 
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CHAPTER FIVE. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
 
Policies to increase agricultural productivity are a subset of the many 
interventions that the Government of Uganda is vigorously implementing to eradicate 
rural poverty. The NAADS program is among such interventions that started in 2001 with 
the aim of improving farmers’ knowledge about farming and marketing outcomes 
through adoption of modern technologies and access to advisory services tailored to the 
local needs. Moreover, the program is implemented through decentralized structures of 
local government, thereby increasing the likelihood that the local needs are matched and 
thus, efficient and effective extension service delivery is expected. 
Being a relatively new intervention that started in 2001, and one involving huge 
financial resources, a fundamental question that echoes through the stakeholders (e.g., 
farmers, NGOs, the implementers and development partners) is whether the program is 
having a positive impact on the livelihoods of the poor. This fieldwork-based thesis 
contributes to the literature on the impacts of the NAADS program by analyzing survey 
data collected from selected farmers in selected districts in Uganda. The data come from 
a sample of 305 farmers collected during September 2005-April 2006 from 7 sub-
counties in 4 districts in rural Uganda. 
The methods applied included a mix of both quantitative and qualitative 
techniques, all aimed at understanding the impact of access to the NAADS program on 
the value of farm production per acre. Qualitative analysis was used to complement the 
quantitative analysis. The data were collected using a questionnaire collecting plot-level 
data by agricultural seasons. The questionnaire combined sections of the LSMS module 
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on agriculture, and household background characteristics and asset sections of the 
Uganda National Household Survey (UNHS). Additional questions capturing NAADS 
specific issues were appended to the questionnaire. Notwithstanding the fieldwork 
challenges, there are important findings, lessons and conclusion that emerged from this 
research. 
We cannot reject the null that the NAADS program has had an impact. The 2SLS 
results show no program impact; however, the OLS results show that the program had a 
positive impact on the value of farm production per acre of about 20 percent. Access to 
markets and roads are negatively related to the value of the farm production per acre, 
although the coefficients are statistically insignificant. The availability of farm equipment 
has a positive and statistically significant impact on the value of farm production per 
acre. We find a negative but statistically insignificant impact of education on the value of 
farm production per acre. 
Awareness of local political processes is negatively related to the value of the 
farm production per acre, but is statistically insignificant. However, satisfaction with the 
management of sub-county authorities is positively related to the value of the farm 
production per acre. Local political connectivity is negatively related to value of the farm 
production per acre, but is statistically insignificant. 
The availability of land is negative and highly statistically significant. In addition, 
the square of the logarithm of land in acres is positive and is statistically significant. 
Household size has a positive and significant coefficient. In addition, having more 
family members aged less than 14 years is positively associated with value of farm 
production, although this coefficient is statistically insignificant. Access to credit is 
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positively related to the value of farm production per acre; although statistically 
insignificant. Age of the household head is negative and statistically insignificant. Sex 
has a positive and statistically insignificant coefficient on the value of farm production 
per acre. Household assets are positively and statistically significantly related to the value 
of the farm production. 
What factors might explain a positive impact of NAADS on the value of farm 
production per acre among participants? 
We find that NAADS farmers participate in the local decision making processes 
governing the program. Unlike the previous traditional extension system, which was 
based on a top-bottom approach, the NAADS program enables the program beneficiaries 
to engage in the enterprise choice of what they want to invest in. Moreover, farmers are 
empowered to hold PSPs accountable. 
The development of farmer institutions aligned to the farmers’ investment 
interests at the village level (thereby incorporating cultural and climatic characteristics) 
has changed the perspectives of farmers to view agriculture as a viable enterprise. 
Farmers’ groups are a source of voice and inclusion (e.g., of women and youth). Voting 
structures are underpinned by clear guidelines. Through the farmers’ fora and the sub-
county farmers’ forum, farmers get to learn about the NAADS activities taking place in 
the sub-county. These institutions have served as a strong mechanism to reduce the 
information asymmetries that impede farmers’ decision making processes. 
We find that, although farmers do not have a history of paying for extension, they 
are contributing to program financing through co-financing. A majority of NAADS 
farmers have paid up their co-funding requirements in the study sites. This may be 
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interpreted to mean that the farmers have appreciated the benefits from the program 
and/or they are beginning to own the NAADS processes. However, it is still a long way 
to go before farmers’ contributions grow to displace the central government transfers. 
Agricultural extension, as a public good, will always require a strong involvement of 
public support. 
The ability for farmers to diversify their enterprise choice is yet another benefit 
among NAADS farmers. We found that NAADS farmers are likely to participate in not 
only crop farming but also animal rearing. Increasingly, participating farmers grow fruits 
and vegetables. These fruits and vegetables are not only a good source of supplementary 
income (beyond that from traditional sources of food or cash crops) but also supplement 
the nutritional needs of the farmers. 
The participation in advisory service provision has increased partnerships 
between NGOs, CBOs and the private sector. Engaging NGOs and CBOs that work with 
local communities can enhance service provision as shown by Barr, Fafchamps, & 
Owens (2005). However, the effectiveness in service delivery of the different private 
sector players is partly influenced by their motives, and the human capacities. Established 
NGOs with a reputation to protect have built strong human capacity and tend to fulfill 
their contractual obligations. At the same time, opening the opportunities to individual 
PSPs created employment for potential graduates from higher institutions of learning. 
However, our fieldwork reviews revealed that such graduates find it difficult to adjust to 
the needs of the farmers. 
The NAADS program has invested heavily in technology development sites. Our 
interviews revealed that the farmers are utilizing the TDS facilities and are heavily 
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involved in their establishment. The hope is that farmers adopt modern farming 
techniques demonstrated and thus, agricultural outcomes are likely to improve in the 
future. 
Despite finding a positive impact of NAADS on the value of farm production per 
acre, we discuss the factors outside of the NAADS program and those inherent in the 
current system of NAADS that might impede further gains from NAADS program. 
There are problems facing local governments in Uganda such as inadequate 
financial resources, inadequate capacity to monitor programs, and the reluctance of local 
authorities to implement the NAADS program. After the elimination of the local graduate 
tax revenues and market dues, local governments do not have a strong local revenue tax 
base from which to get financial resources to co-finance the NAADS, and later on to 
facilitate the monitoring of the program. This is a serious problem that will require urgent 
attention if decentralization of agricultural extension is to become sustainable. 
Despite the increased administrative decentralization, local governments are still 
faced with low human capacity to plan and implement government programs. Lastly, 
local government authorities have been less keen to facilitate the implementation of 
NAADS activities, and where they have done so, it is only an individual effort (e.g., the 
community development officers) and not as a team at the local level. This problem will 
require a broader mandate coordinated across the line ministries or agencies of 
agriculture and local government to devise ways of ensuring local government authorities 
pay attention to NAADS as they do for other government programs running at the local 
level. 
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With respect to the NAADS design, there are challenges at varying layers of the 
organizational structure. At the lowest level, there are some concerns of the poor quality 
of services provided by the service providers. This problem partly stems from the absence 
of well trained, although qualified individual PSPs. Individual PSPs require re-tooling in 
terms of the skills required to deal with the complex problems in rural areas. 
There is weak monitoring of the program, particularly by the program 
beneficiaries themselves. Some farmers pay less attention to reporting on the progress of 
the activities of the PSPs, although there are situations where farmers’ groups have held 
PSPs accountable and thus taken actions to nullify contracts and in some cases asked the 
PSPs to refund the funds. 
The problem of delayed disbursement of NAADS funds is prevalent at the sub-
county level. The cause of this problem is “claimed” to be at the district level. There is 
need to find out why this is the case. Late disbursing followed by the need to spend 
before the end of the fiscal year imply quick and often less efficient contracting 
procedures, which may adversely affect the program outcomes. 
Despite the establishment of farmers’ groups, there are specific issues that will 
need attention with respect to strengthening these institutions. There are challenges in the 
management of technology demonstration sites and in the need to strengthen 
communication among group members. 
The next question is whether the NAADS program is sustainable? We offer 
insights to this issue based on the fieldwork results. In terms of fiscal sustainability, the 
NAADS budget is largely donor funded and this raises the question of whether the 
government of Uganda will reduce on the borrowing to finance the NAADS program by 
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scaling up on the portion of domestic resources earmarked to the NAADS program? This 
is dependent on how fast the transformation of the agricultural sector from subsistence to 
commercial levels happens, and whether the required marketing systems and value 
addition beyond agro-processing but toward some “sort of agro-manufacturing” (e.g., 
fruit canning) become a reality. The good news is that farmers are paying their co-
finance; but the bad news is that local governments are not co-financing their required 
obligations. Moreover, despite the government’s commitment to continued financing of 
NAADS, there has been difficulty for the government to increase its spending to the 
agricultural sector, citing the ceiling of the MTEF. 
How then do we strengthen decentralization of agricultural extension with 
inadequate fiscal capacity? There is an urgent need of addressing the local fiscal 
capacities of sub-governments if they are to take charge of decentralized extension. Local 
governments have no major tax sources from which they can generate resources to co-
finance the NAADS program. Moreover, it is not sustainable for the government to 
continue providing compensations for the elimination of the gradated taxes and market 
dues, which were the main sources of tax revenues to local governments. It is also 
unlikely that farmers will shoulder the financial burden of local governments. Farmers 
are themselves in a great need of support in terms of marketing support to promote their 
activities. At the same time the central government can continue to channel earmarked 
transfers to support NAADS. 
In terms of human resources, there is a thin structure of program managers at the 
district and sub-county level. NAADS managers at the lower levels of government 
perform many tasks that the quality/effectiveness of their activities may be compromised. 
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This has had implications on the monitoring of NAADS activities in the light of a limited 
budget. Typically, at the sub-county, the NAADS sub-coordinator and the community 
development officer are the only officials engaged actively in NAADS activities. Support 
from other local government officials is limited. This problem must be addressed through 
coordination of NAADS activities by the MoLG and MFPED. 
With respect to institutional and social sustainability, the NAADS program has 
revamped the farmers’ organizations in Uganda. NAADS farmers’ groups are active in 
deciding what to choose for investment and they take the lead in the selection of PSPs to 
deliver contracted extension. Farmers’ groups have united farmers and created a forum 
for bargaining. However, farmers need further guidance in making the right enterprise 
choices. 
Generally, advisory information on marketing of agricultural produce seems to be 
limited. The farmers we interviewed in the focus group discussions expressed their 
dissatisfaction of the competence of most individual and private firms’ advisory services 
on marketing of agriculture produce. Despite the NAADS efforts to integrate marketing, 
it seems in general that there is until now no clear marketing strategy of farmers’ produce 
from the rural areas to the road-side and urban markets. 
Coordination of NAADS activities among line ministries must be strengthened. 
This coordination will have to embrace the different donor agencies in Uganda’s 
agricultural sector. There is need to harmonize the activities to be funded within the 
agricultural sector over the medium term and to guide the process of which 
responsibilities are handled by the different ministries. The main output from 
coordination should be a clear policy on the role of sub-national governments in NAADS 
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activities. Our findings reveal that sub-counties consider NAADS activities as being a 
secondary responsibility. This is consistent with findings from the NAADS mid-term 
reviews. Until now, the NAADS program is not well conceived in local government 
structures. 
In conclusion, this study finds a statistically significant impact of access to 
advisory services under NAADS on the value of farm production per acre. We caution 
the reader to recognize that this study did not analyze all the impacts of NAADS on other 
agricultural outcomes. In addition, the study suffers from the failure to control for 
spillover effects, and other general equilibrium that affect program impacts. 
Further research will be needed to confirm this finding and to also find the impact 
of the NAADS program on other agricultural outcomes that were not a focus of this 
study. Lastly, to the extent that the NAADS program is not the only intervention expected 
to improve rural farmers’ livelihoods, there is need to focus on other complementary 
interventions to fix the problems of low agricultural productivity in Uganda. To recap the 
words of Nkonya et al. ( 2004) there is no “one-size-fits all” solution to the complex 
problems of small farmers in the diverse circumstance of rural Uganda. 
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MAP 1. NAADS COVERAGE IN UGANDA 
 
 
Source: National Agricultural Advisory Services (NAADS). 
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APPENDICES 
Table A1. Survey Questionnaire [attached in separate file] 
Table A2. Unit conversions for computing crop yield 
 
Unit Code on 
questionnaire
Conversion factor: 
unit to kgs 
Kilograms 01 1 
Sack (120 kgs) 09 120 
Sack (100 kgs) 10 100 
Sack (80 kgs) 11 80 
Sack (50 kgs) 12 50 
Sack (unspecified) 13 20 
Jerrican (20 liters) 14 20 
Jerrican (10 liters) 15 10 
Jerrican (5 liters) 16 5 
Jerrican (3 liters) 17 3 
Jerrican (2 liters) 18 2 
Jerrican (1 liter) 19 1 
Tin (20 liters) 20 20 
Tin (5 liters) 21 5 
Plastic basin (20 liters) 22 20 
Kimbo/Cowboy/Blueband Tin (2 kg) 29 1 
Kimbo/Cowboy/Blueband Tin (1 kg) 30 0.5 
Kimbo/Cowboy/Blueband Tin (0.5 kg) 31 0.25 
Basket (20 kg) 38 20 
Basket (10 kg) 39 10 
Basket (5 kg) 40 5 
Heap (unspecified) 65 1.5 
Bundle (unspecified) 67 1 
Bunch (Big) 68 15 
Bunch (Medium) 69 10 
Bunch (Small) 70 7 
Cluster (unspecified) 71 2 
Number of units (general) 86 Depends on crop* 
Source: Uganda National Bureau of Statistics. Code extracted from UNHS 1999/00. 
 
* Across the study sites certain crops such as cabbages, pineapples, water melons, and 
paw paws were harvested in varying sizes. To capture this variation, data on Weights of 
these crops was collected from three different markets within each study sub-county and 
for each crop I sampled the small, medium and large taking the average weight for a 
particular sub-county over the same crops. 
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Table A3. Procedure and data used to compute sampling  weights 
 
Sampling Weights for non-NAADS households in the non-NAADS district 
Equal the number of households in the entire district divided by the number of 
household sampled. Each farmer gets the same weight 
Sampling Weights for non-NAADS households in non-NAADS sub-counties in 
NAADS districts 
Equals the number of non-NAADS households in non-NAADS sub-counties in 
the district divided by the number of non-NAADS households sampled in this sub-county 
MULTIPLIED by the ratio:  the number of non-NAADS households in non-NAADS sub-
counties in the six NAADS districts divided by the number of non-NAADS households 
in non-NAADS sub-counties in the three selected NAADS districts. 
 
Sampling Weights for non-NAADS households in NAADS sub-counties in NAADS 
districts 
Equals the number of non-NAADS households in all the NAADS sub-counties in 
the district divided by the number of non-NAADS households sampled in this sub-county 
MULTIPLIED by the ratio of the number of non-NAADS households in NAADS sub-
counties in the six NAADS districts divided by the number of non-NAADS households 
in NAADS sub-counties in the three selected NAADS districts. 
 
Sampling Weights for NAADS households in NAADS sub-counties in NAADS districts 
Equals the total number of NAADS households in the district divided by the 
number of NAADS households in NAADS sub-counties in NAADS districts sampled 
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MULTIPLIED by the total number of NAADS households in all six NAADS districts 
divided by the total number of NAADS households in the three selected districts. 
 
District level data 
District (i) Mukono Kabale Tororo Arua Soroti Kibaale Kayunga Total 
Total # of hhs in district (a)* 187967 95071 80334 151851 70455 85038 62039 732755 
Total # hhs living in NAADS SCs 
(b)* 
181507 60491 41120 79355 60687 83902 0 507062 
Estimated # hhs participating in 
NAADS (c )** 
31968 39114 8226 27450 21726 21636 0 150120 
Estimated # of hhs not participating 
in NAADS but live in NAADS SCs 
(d=b-c)*** 
149539 21377 32894 51905 38961 62266 0 356942 
Estimated # of hhs not participating 
in NAADS in non-NAADS SCs (e 
=a-b)*** 
6460 34580 39214 72496 9768 1136 62039 163654 
Estimated # of non-NAADS hhs in 
district (f=d+e)*** 
155999 55957 72108 124401 48729 63402 62039 582635 
Sources: * UBOS’s population census; ** NAADS Secretariat; and *** Authors’ 
Computations. 
 
Sub-county level data 
District (i) Mukono Kabale Tororo Kayunga 
Selected NAADS Sub-counties Kasawo Kyanamira Kisoko  
Total # of hhs living in selected NAADS sub-county 
in district "I" (g)* 
6683 3976 2927  
Estimated # of hhs participating in NAADS within a 
NAADS sub-county (h)** 
1764 1268 1044  
Estimated  # of hhs not participating in NAADS but 
live within a NAADS sub-county (k=g-h)*** 
4919 2708 1883  
Number of NAADS hhs sampled in study (m)*** 44 44 40  
Number of non-NAADS hhs within NAADS SC 
sampled (n)*** 
25 19 23  
Selected non-NAADS sub-counties Ntunda Kaharo Paya  
Total # of hhs living in selected non-NAADS sub-
county in district "I" (o)* 
3025 3635 6549 13209 
Number of sampled hhs living in selected non-
NAADS sub-county (p)*** 
20 18 18  
Selected non-NAADS SC in non-NAADS district    Kangulumira 
Total # of hhs living in selected non-NAADS SC in 
non-District (q)* 
   9453 
Number of households sampled (r )***    51 
Sources: * UBOS’s population census; ** NAADS Secretariat; and *** Authors’ 
Computations. 
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Table A4. Average price data of selected crops grown in the study sites. 
 
Crop name Tororo Kabele Mukono 
matooke-food type 619 764 560 
matooke-beer type 214  71 
matooke-sIet type  311 400 
maize  467 323 
finger millet  450 583 
sorghum  373 417 
rice 980 793 1083 
beans 567 600 1100 
field peas  467  
cow peas   867 
pigeon peas   300 
ground nuts  1233 1960 
soya beans   550 
sim-sim   1150 
cotton    
irish potatoes 500 190 367 
sIet potatoes 233 117 278 
cassava 200 500 311 
    
coffee   700 
tea    
tobacco    
trees    
flowers    
oranges 250 110 300 
passion fruits 683 717 1267 
pineapples 253 217 233 
mangoes 147 77  
    
pawpaw 433 340 167 
other fruits  800 83 
onions 1033 350 1533 
cabbages 358 187 143 
dodo 131 103 300 
tomatoes 1058 450 1333 
carrots 317   
other vegetables    
vanilla   2667 
Source: Author. 
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Table A5. Summary data on (PSP) contracts in NAADS study sites (Kasawo subcounty) 
Kasawo sub-county in Mukono district. 
Year of 
contract 
Type (s) of Enterprise PSP company Contract value 
(1 U.S. dollar 
=1800 Uganda 
Shillings ) 
Contract duration 
(days) 
Status of contract/Remark on quality of services 
      
2002/03 Bananas KasimI Consults 4444 132 Completed- not satisfactory 
 Vanilla Uganda marketing serv 
4444 
132 Terminated-not satisfactory. Inability to complete 
assignment 
 Coffee Rocagric 3889 119 Completed-satisfactory and good 
 Diary cattle I Rocagric 2528 77 Completed-satisfactory and good 
 Diary cattle II Manpower associates 2528 77 Completed-satisfactory and fair 
 Diary cattle bull 
scheme establishment 
Rocagric 
2406 
44 Completed-satisfactory and good 
      
2003/04 Local chicken Green Pastures 2889 88 Completed-satisfactory and fair 
 Piggery Rocagric 6484 88 Completed-satisfactory and good 
 Diary Cattle Manpower Associates 3250 99 Not completed-delayed implementation 
 Diary cattle/bull 
scheme establishment 
Rocagric 
3190 
44 Completed-satisfactory and good 
 Vanilla Rocagric 2889 88 Completed-satisfactory and good 
 Goat Manpower Associates 2528 77 Completed-not satisfactory 
 Vegetable I Banda quality pdts 2167 66 Not completed-delayed implementation 
 Vegetables II Green World Environment 
Consult 2501 
77 Not completed-delayed implementation-time 
elapsed 
      
2004/05 Piggery Agrovet Ltd 
3611 
110 Completed-not satisfactory-poor quality of pig 
structures-but training was okay. 
 Local chicken PASSATA (U) Ltd 3611 110 Completed-not satisfactory-poor quality 
 Diary Cattle PASSATA (U) Ltd 3613 110 Completed-satisfactory-fair 
 Vanilla post harvest AWA Global ltd 
3057 
88 Completed-not satisfactory-poor quality of 
structures and poor training 
Source: Author 
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Table A6.Summary data on (PSP) contracts in the NAADS study sites (Kisoko subcounty) 
Kisoko sub-county in Tororo district 
year Type of enterprise Name of PSP Contract duration 
(days) 
Amount (1 UD 
=1800 UgShs) 
Status of contract/remarks on quality of services 
2002/03 Commercial pig 
production 
AGRUDAS 110 
2632 
Terminated due to untimely implementation. However, quality 
was fair. 
2002/03 Local chicken 
improvement 
AGRUDAS 132 
3757 
Terminated due to untimely implementation. 
2002/03 Pineapple production Individual 88 1526 Completed but  delayed due to delayed flow of funds 
2002/03 Goat management Individual 132 3200 Completed but delayed due to delayed flow of funds 
2002/03 Banana production Individual 110 2528 Completed but delayed due to delayed flow of funds 
2002/03 Groundnuts 
production/improvement 
ROMTEC (firm) 132 
3552 
Completed a season later due to low financial capacity of PSP 
and slow release of NAADS funds 
2003/04 Pig production Individual 70 1733 Completed according to schedule-quality very good 
2003/04 Groundnuts production Tororo Women Uplift 
ltd (firm) 
64 
1960 
Completed according to schedule-quality very good 
2003/04 Local Poultry 
Management 
Tororo District 
Farmers Association 
(TODIFA) 
120 
3611 
Terminated due to slow implementation and poor quality of 
demonstration sites 
2003/2004 Soya bean production Individual 110 
2489 
Completed but a cropping season later due to poor germination 
of demonstrations in the 1st season 
2003/2004 Groundnuts production Individual 97 3474 Completed well in time-very good quality of work 
2004/2005 Groundnut production Individual 100 3422 On-going-good progress 
2004/2005 Local Chicken 
Improvement 
RUDI (firm) 120 
4221 
On-going, good progress 
2004/2005 Pig production RAVE (firm) 100 3392 On-going, good progress 
Source: Author 
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Table A7.Summary data on (PSP) contracts in the NAADS study sites (Kyanamira subcounty) 
Kyanamira sub-county in Kabale district 
year Type of enterprise Name of PSP Contract duration 
(days) 
Amount (1 USD 
=1800 UgShs) 
Status of contract/remarks on quality of services 
2002/2003 Irish potato production 
and management 
Kigezi Service 
network 
5 months 
2230 
Completed-status satisfactory and good quality 
2002/2003 Fish pond farming Individual 2 months 1239 Incomplete-but satisfactory performance 
2002/2003 Temperate fruits 
management 
Individual 8 months 
3213 
Completed-satisfactory-good quality 
2002/03 Irish potato production Kigezi service network 143 days 4892 Completed-satisfactory performance 
2002/03 Management of Small 
animals 
Rural Agric Services 
Support Company 
3 months 
3323 
Not satisfactory 
2002/03 Coffee management FODRA Holding ltd 6 months 3246 Not satisfactory-poor quality of services 
2004 Mushroom growing Prominent services 4 months 2369 Not satisfactory 
2004 Irish Potato Production Individual 110 days 7139 Completed-satisfactory-good quality 
2005 Apple Growing and 
Management 
Denta services ltd 88 days 
3083 
Completed but not very good quality 
2005 Management of meat 
goats 
Sunshine protects ltd 66 days 
6458 
Completed-satisfactory 
 Irish potato production Firm 36 days 3273 Completed-good job done-satisfactory quality 
 Fish pond  farming Individual 88 3036 On-going with good progress 
 Goat management Firm 88 days 5237 On-going with good progress 
Source: Author. 
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Table A8. First stage regression results from 2SLS. 
tof Coef. Std. Err. P-value 
agrocl2 -3.102 0.312 0.000 
agrocl3 3.222 0.333 0.000 
Average rainfall for the period 2004-2005. -0.177 0.016 0.000 
Dummy for near period market (1 = near market) 0.023 0.051 0.661 
Near feeder road (1 = near road; 0 otherwise) -0.055 0.059 0.358 
Land in acres (logarithm) 0.041 0.058 0.475 
Square of land in acres (logarithm) -0.001 0.020 0.960 
Logarithm of farm equipment 0.017 0.025 0.487 
Logarithm of household assets -0.025 0.023 0.274 
Education of the household head in years of schooling 0.018 0.006 0.006 
Logarithm of age of household head 0.214 0.098 0.029 
Household size 0.047 0.061 0.438 
Dependency ratio 0.099 0.126 0.433 
Access to credit (1= access to credit; 0 otherwise) 0.154 0.056 0.006 
Sex of household head (1 = male;0 = female) -0.036 0.067 0.598 
Whether household has had a sick member 0.016 0.049 0.754 
Whether household participated in local elections 0.156 0.123 0.206 
Political connections of the farmer -0.024 0.075 0.749 
Whether farmer is satisfied with management of sub-
county authorities management 
0.060 0.068 0.373 
Quality of development plan -10.272 1.259 0.000 
Communication and Accountability 2.048 0.320 0.000 
Local Revenue Performance 1.142 0.188 0.000 
Constant 21.625 2.167 0.000 
R-Squared 0.4863   
Number of Observations 266   
Source: Author. 
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Table A9. Sub-county fixed effects 
  Coef. Std. Err. 
Type of farmer 0.280 0.121 
Near market dummy -0.088 0.097 
Near road dummy -0.060 0.112 
Availability of land -1.540 0.109 
Land squared 0.079 0.037 
Availability of land 0.084 0.046 
Household wealth  0.148 0.044 
Education level of household head -0.016 0.012 
Age of household head -0.185 0.186 
Household size 0.183 0.115 
Dependency ratio 0.017 0.238 
Availability of credit 0.056 0.106 
Sex of the household head 0.109 0.127 
Whether any household member is sick -0.006 0.093 
Awareness of local voting processes -0.002 0.233 
Political connectivity -0.208 0.141 
Whether satisfied with sub-county 
management 0.094 0.128 
Constant 10.610 0.931 
Number of observations 266  
R-squared 0.71  
Source: Author. 
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